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BY THE BOOK:
New - s. 231.1 B.C.’s Motor Vehicle Act: 
Banning Smoking When Children Present
On April 7, 2009, British Columbia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act was amended by adding a 
section that now bans smoking in a motor 
vehicle when children are present. April 7 is 
also World Health Day. The new section 
reads: 
Smoking in motor vehicle prohibited - s. 231.1 
(1) In this section, "tobacco" means tobacco leaves or 
products produced from tobacco in any form or 
for any use.
(2) A person must not smoke tobacco, or hold lighted 
tobacco, in a motor vehicle that is occupied by a 
person under the age of 16 years, whether or not 
any window, sunroof, car-top, door or other feature 
of the vehicle is open.
(3) A person who contravenes subsection (2) commits 
an offence.
The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make 
regulations exempting any person or class of persons 
from the requirements of this section and prescribing 
conditions for those exemptions.
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars!!! The 
British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, Police Academy are 
hosting the Police Leadership 2011 Conference in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada's largest 
police leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership topics 
presented by world-renowned speakers. 
www.policeleadershipconference.com
SUPPORT THE BADGE:
RELATIONAL SURVIVAL 
FOR POLICE FAMILIES
“The true weight of the badge is not overcome by 
muscle, not found in the gym, not measured on a 
scale. This weight requires a strength and 
conditioning for which few officers are trained. The 
badge is not just pinned on a chest, it is pinned on a 
lifestyle.” - Police Officer
www.supportthebadge.ca
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“One of my co-workers receives your 
newsletter and often forwards it on to 
me. I find the review of current issues 
and case law very beneficial.  I'd like to be on the 
mailing list to receive this newsletter regularly.” - 
Police Constable, Ontario
*********
“I was sent several copies of 10-8 by 
another officer and would like to be 
added to the mailing list. Our 
department doesn’t do a good job on keeping us up to 
date with Canadian case laws and I find your 
publication very helpful.”  - Conservation Officer 
*********
“I would like to commend you folks on 
this great publication, I have been a loyal 
reader for some time now. I am writing 
to see if you could please add me on the email list so 
I may share it with my fellow officers ... Thank you 
and keep up the good work..” - Police Constable, 
Ontario
*********
“I was wondering if you can add me to 
your e-mail list for the a/n publication.  
I have found many of the articles to be 
of great interest and would enjoy being able to 
continue to read them as their are published.” - RCMP 
Corporal, Saskatchewan
*********
“Keep up the excellent work...it is 
surely valued by us law enforcement 
folks.” - Government Employee, 
British Columbia
IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of 
the law. Each question is based on a case featured in 
this issue. See page 42 for the answers.
1. When obtaining a search warrant under s.11 of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act a judge is 
required to endorse any dynamic (no-knock) entry. 
 (a) True;
 (b) False.
  
2. Flight from a crime scene can be considered by an 
officer in deciding whether there are reasonable 
grounds to  arrest. 
 (a) True;
 (b) False.
  
3. A search incidental to lawful arrest will not 
become unreasonable if the police have  more than 
one purpose in mind as long as one of the purposes 
is legitimate as an incident to the arrest.
 (a) True 
 (b) False
 
4. What percentage of the Canada’s Supreme Court 
decisions were unanimous in 2008?
 (a) 24%;
 (b) 55%;
 (c) 76%;
 (d) 87%;
 (e) 92%.
5. The police are not required to hold off questioning 
a detainee who has exercised their right to 
counsel and asks to speak to a lawyer again. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. For a police officer to be qualified as an expert in 
drug investigations the officer must have 
acquired their special knowledge through formal 
study. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
www.10-8.ca
POLICE & PEACE OFFICERS’ 
NATIONAL MEMORIAL DAY 
Sunday September 27, 2009
Police and Peace Officers' 
National Memorial Day provides 
Canadians with an opportunity 
to acknowledge the dedication 
of police and peace officers who 
have died in the line of duty.
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TOP IMPAIRED DRIVING 
INVESTIGATORS RECOGNIZED BY 
BCAA TRAFFIC SAFETY 
FOUNDATION
On Thursday February 26th the British Columbia 
Automobile Association (BCAA) Traffic Safety 
Foundation publicly recognized 26 R.C.M.P. and 
Municipal Police Department officers for their 
exemplary efforts to remove impaired drivers from 
the roadways in the Lower Mainland of British 
Columbia.
The 26 police officers 
were recognized at a 
reception at the 
BCAA offices in 
Burnaby where they 
were inducted into 
“Alexa’s Team” in 
honour of four year 
old Alexa Middelaer 
who was killed on May 
17, 2008 in Delta as 
the result of the actions of an alleged impaired driver.  
Alexa’s Parents, Laurel and Michael Middelaer 
presented certificates and a personal letter to each 
of the officers.
The police officers recognized were:
Abbotsford Police
• Cst. Leisa Shea - Fraser Valley Integrated Road 
Safety Unit
New Westminster Police
• Cst. Josh Hooker
Port Moody Police
• S/Sgt. Manj Kaila -  NCO i/c Greater Vancouver 
Integrated Road Safety Unit
• Cst. Victoria Heller
R.C.M.P.
• Cst. John Fenety - Greater Vancouver Integrated 
Road Safety Unit
• Cst. Alice Fox - Greater Vancouver Integrated 
Road Safety Unit
• S/Sgt. Dave Peat -  NCO i/c Surrey Detachment 
Traffic
• Cpl. Lorne Lecker -  Surrey Detachment Traffic
• Cst. Tom Meleady -  Surrey Detachment Traffic
• Cst. Duane Hillier -  Fraser Valley Integrated Road 
Safety Unit
• Cst. Trevor Vokins - Langley Detachment Traffic
• Cst. Jason Bayer - Langley Detachment Traffic
• Cst. Terry Gillespie - Sea-To-Sky Traffic 
Services
• Cst. Steve Small - Fraser Valley Traffic Services
• Cst. Glen Porter - Ridge Meadows Detachment 
(formerly Deas Island Traffic Services)
• Cst. Mark Booth - Deas Island Traffic Services
• Cst. Alan Windover - Port Mann Traffic Services
• Cst. Mark Cumbers - Port Mann Traffic Services
• Cst. Dustin Young -  Surrey Detachment (formerly 
Port Mann Traffic Services)
• Cst. Joshua Becker - Port Mann Traffic Services
• Cpl. Richard O’Rourke - Coquitlam Detachment 
Traffic 
• Cst. Michael Halewood - Coquitlam Detachment 
Traffic
Vancouver Police
• Cst. John Bercic
West Vancouver Police
• Cst. Steve McCuaig - Greater Vancouver 
Integrated Road Safety Unit 
• Cst. Eric Melim
• Cst. Dave Noon
These 26 police officers were collectively responsible 
for investigating 389 impaired drivers who were 
recommended for criminal charges.  They also issued 
188 90-day Administrative Driving Prohibitions and 
1,140 24-Hour Driving Prohibitions. In 2008 these 
police officers removed a total of 1,717 drinking 
drivers from Lower Mainland roads.
In 2009, “Alexa’s Team” will be expanded to recognize 
outstanding impaired driving investigators from 
throughout British Columbia, both R.C.M.P. and 
municipal police departments.
Source: S/Sgt. I.E. (Ted) Emanuels, Traffic Operations 
Officer, R.C.M.P. Lower Mainland District
www.10-8.ca
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INVENTORY SEARCH NOT 
LIMITED TO ITEMIZING 
‘VISIBLE CONTENTS’
 R. v. Wint, 2009 ONCA 52, 
The accused was stopped for “stunt 
driving” after he nearly sideswiped an 
unmarked police vehicle and then drove 
for eight kilometres along a highway at a 
speed of 170 km/h.  Stunting is an offence under 
s.172(1) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA) and 
one for which the vehicle may be impounded. While 
radioing for assistance the officer saw the accused 
place a number of music CDs into a small black 
drawstring bag on the back seat of his vehicle. Two 
backup officers soon arrived and the accused was 
placed in a cruiser. The two back-up officers then 
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. 
A black bag found on the floor behind the passenger 
seat was opened and a small black nylon CD case was 
seen inside it. The case felt heavy and, based on 
information received from the dispatcher, the officer 
was concerned that it might contain a gun. No gun was 
found but an ounce of crack cocaine was, along with 
about two ounces of marijuana, three cell phones, a 
blackberry and a digital weigh scale. In addition to 
being charged with stunt driving, the accused was also 
charged with possessing cocaine and possessing 
marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
concluded that the police did not breach the accused’s 
s.8 rights because he found the police were entitled 
under s.172 of the HTA to do an inventory search of 
the car. The black bag was plainly visible in the car’s 
interior and the police were conducting a lawful 
inventory search when they found it. The trial judge 
also ruled that even if the 
accused’s s.8 Charter rights 
were breached the evidence 
was nonetheless admissible 
under s.24(2). The evidence 
was real, the breach technical, 
and the officers were acting in 
good faith. The accused was 
convicted of simple marihuana 
possession and possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in his analysis, both 
factually and legally. Factually, he submitted that the 
trial judge should have rejected police evidence that 
they were doing an inventory search, but instead were 
really searching for a gun. Legally, he contended that 
the police must limit their inventory search to 
itemizing only visible property of apparent value—
opening the bag could not be justified and the police 
could do no more than note its presence. Thus, in the 
accused’s view, the police were not entitled to search 
the black bag and CD case and the fruits of their 
search should have been excluded under s.24(2) of 
the Charter.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected both of the 
accused’s arguments. First, the trial judge found the 
police were in fact conducting an inventory search. 
The search was not a sham nor conducted for an 
improper or ulterior purpose. Just because the police 
may have also been looking for a gun did not render 
the inventory search unlawful. Second, inventorying 
visible property is not restricted to itemizing objects 
found in a car, but can include itemizing an object’s 
contents. 
The rationale for an inventory search — documenting 
contents of apparent value — serves the person’s 
property interest by safeguarding it while it is in 
police custody. In this case, the Court stated:
Given the underlying rationale of inventory 
searches, to proceed [by only itemizing objects 
found in a car, but not their contents] would render 
these searches virtually meaningless.  Thus, if the 
police found a purse and could not look inside it, they 
would have no way of knowing whether it contained 
pennies or thousands of dollars and if the latter, 
what steps should be taken to safeguard the large 
sum of money. That, in our view, would defeat the 
purpose of the exercise. In 
short, if inventory searches 
are to be meaningful and 
serve the purpose for which 
they are intended, the police 
cannot be hobbled as the 
[accused] would suggest. 
They must be able to search 
and itemize the contents of 
objects such as purses, 
wallets and bags like the one 
observed in this case, to 
“[The police] must be able to search and 
itemize the contents of objects such as 
purses, wallets and bags ... to determine their 
contents. Of course, any inventory search 
must be executed in a reasonable manner 
and as is the case with other warrantless 
searches, reasonableness of police conduct 
will be judged against the totality of the 
circumstances revealed in each case.”
www.10-8.ca
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determine their contents. Of course, any inventory 
search must be executed in a reasonable manner and 
as is the case with other warrantless searches, 
reasonableness of police conduct will be judged 
against the totality of the circumstances revealed 
in each case. 
The search of the black bag and its contents, as well 
as the search of the CD case and its contents, was 
entirely reasonable and justified. Indeed, the police 
would have been derelict in their duties had they 
not carried out the searches. [paras. 15-16]
Thus, the search of the bag and CD case was lawful 
and did not breach the accused’s s.8 Charter rights. 
And furthermore, the Court of Appeal saw no error 
with the trial judge’s s.24(2) analysis. The evidence 
was admissible and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
FLIGHT FROM CRIME SCENE 
IMPORTANT IN ASSESSING 
GROUNDS 
R. v. Williams, 2009 ONCA 35
A police officer on patrol received a 
radio call of a robbery in progress at a 
gas station, which was just around the 
corner. The officer responded with 
lights and siren and, within the moments he needed to 
arrive, the radio dispatcher provided a description of 
the robber. The officer saw the accused, who shared 
most of the robber’s distinguishing traits, running 
away from the scene. There was nobody else on the 
street and the officer believed he 
had found the robber.  After a 
short pursuit, the accused was 
arrested, searched, and 34 grams 
of crack cocaine was found in his 
pocket.
At trial in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, the trial judge 
excluded the crack cocaine under 
s.24(2) of the Charter after 
finding the officer breached the accused’s ss.8 and 9 
Charter rights. She ruled the officer lacked the 
objective grounds for the detention and search. In 
her view, the descriptive factors were generic, 
applied to thousands of people, and, because there 
was a weight discrepancy between the suspect 
description and the accused, the officer should have 
entered the gas station to confirm that the robber 
was no longer there. The trial judge held the 
admission of the drugs would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute and the accused was 
acquitted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in finding Charter 
breaches when she concluded the officer’s grounds to 
arrest the accused were not objectively 
reasonable. In the Crown’s opinion, there were ample 
grounds to justify the accused’s arrest and the 
search that followed was incidental thereto.
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown, 
holding the totality of the circumstances test formed 
the basis for the objective assessment of the grounds 
proffered for the arrest. The Court stated:
In this case, the totality of the circumstances 
strongly supports the officer’s decision to detain 
and arrest the [accused].  The officer was told that 
there was a robbery in progress at the gas 
station. Within about a minute, he was at the site 
and saw a person, running away from the 
station.  When the officer first observed the 
runner, he was about 20-25 metres from the 
station.  The description he had been given was: 
male, black, wearing a blue hat and blue jeans, 39-40 
years old, 5’ 7” tall and 240 pounds. The person he 
spotted running away from the gas station was: 
male, black, wearing a black baseball cap, blue jeans 
and a black leather jacket, 38 years 
old, 5’ 9” tall and 160 pounds.  Of 
these six factors, five are either 
identical or very similar and one 
(weight) is spectacularly different.  
In our view, in “the totality of the 
circumstances”, including a robbery 
scenario, a man running from the 
scene, and elapsed time of about a 
minute, the single significant 
difference between the radioed 
description of the potential robber and the 
description of the man [the officer] saw running 
from the scene is not enough to render the 
detention and arrest objectively unreasonable.
………
“The determination of whether the 
officer had reasonable grounds 
must be made in the context of 
the circumstances presented to 
the officer. In this case, the 
circumstances included a fleeing 
suspect.”
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… It is true that the five identical or similar factors 
are generic in the sense that they apply to many 
people.  However, in this case the potential 
application of these factors is hugely reduced – to 
be precise, to one – by the singular fact that there 
was only one person the officer saw when he arrived 
at the scene and that person was running away from 
an alleged robbery site.
Nor do we think that the weight discrepancy 
required [the officer] to stop his chase and enter 
the gas station to ascertain if the robber was still 
there. In light of the timing (about a minute) and 
the situation (a man running from the scene), the 
officer was entitled to continue the chase of the 
suspect he saw in front of him. The determination 
of whether the officer had reasonable grounds 
must be made in the context of the circumstances 
presented to the officer.  In this case, the 
circumstances included a fleeing suspect.   [paras. 
5-8]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SMELL OF ALCOHOL ON BREATH 
PROVIDES ENOUGH FOR 
ROADSIDE DEMAND
R. v. Carson, 2009 ONCA 157
The accused was convicted of driving 
over 80mg% in the Ontario Court of 
Justice. The trial judge concluded that 
the officer had reasonable grounds to 
make a roadside breath demand under s.254(2) of the 
Criminal Code. The accused’s appeal to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice was successful. The appeal 
judge ruled that the investigating officer could not 
conclude that the driver had alcohol in his body based 
on the smell of alcohol on his breath. His conviction 
was overturned. 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, which restored the conviction after finding 
the appeal judge erred. In relying on an earlier 
decision (R. v. Lindsay (1999), 134 C.C.C. 463 
(Ont.C.A.)) the appeal judges held that the smell of 
alcohol on a person’s breath can provide the necessary 
grounds to demand a roadside sample. Plus, in this 
case, the officer had more than the odour of alcohol. 
The accused also denied he had drank any alcohol. 
These two factors, taken together, provided the 
necessary grounds for the demand.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable suspicion - odour of alcohol
“An officer may make an ALERT 
demand where she reasonably suspects 
that a person who is operating a motor 
vehicle has alcohol in his or her body 
(s.254(2) of the Criminal Code). There 
need only be a reasonable suspicion and that 
reasonable suspicion need only relate to the existence 
of alcohol in the body.  The officer does not have to 
believe that the accused has committed any 
crime. .... The fact that there may be an explanation for 
the smell of alcohol does not take away from the fact 
that there exists a reasonable suspicion within the 
meaning of the section.” - Ontario Court of Appeal, R. v. 
Lindsay, (1999),134 C.C.C. 463 (Ont.C.A.)
.
BY THE BOOK:
Division 9.01 B.C.’S Motor Vehicle Act Regs.
Duty to report bullet marks or blood stains
“The owner or manager of every motor 
vehicle repair shop or garage shall keep 
a record in writing of all repairs made 
therein to the body, hood, radiator, 
fenders, running board or wheels of any 
motor vehicle, showing the make and style 
of the motor vehicle, its licence number, the name of the 
person procuring the repairs to be made, the nature of 
the repairs and the date on which the repairs are made, 
and shall, upon the request of any peace officer, furnish 
to the peace officer complete information respecting the 
repairs so made; and in the case of any motor vehicle on 
which marks are found which have the appearance of or 
in any way resemble bullet marks or blood stains, the 
owner or manager shall immediately notify the officer in 
charge of the nearest Provincial or municipal police office 
respecting the same.“ [emphasis added]
www.10-8.ca
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UTTERING FALSE LENS RESULTS 
IN CONVICTION 
R. v. Baptista, 2008 BCPC 388
A police officer who received a LENS 
(Law Enforcement Notification) to 
attend as a witness at a trial did not 
show up. When confronted by his 
superior, the officer said he had been denotified and 
produced a copy of the denotification bearing a 
denotification stamp. The document, however, was a 
false document constructed and altered from a 
denotification given to another police officer in 
another case. The accused police officer was charged 
with making a false document and with uttering it. 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
Crown argued that the accused was the only person 
with a motive to produce the false document — to 
avoid the negative consequence of failing to attend 
court. The accused, on the other hand, submitted that 
another officer could simply have been playing a  
prank on him, given that some officers are prone to 
playing jokes. Judge MacArthur rejected the 
officer’s claim and convicted him of uttering a false 
document. He stated:
... In my view, the evidence that the accused 
presented the forged document when asked to 
account for his non-attendance creates an 
overwhelming inference that he either authored the 
false document himself or uttered it, knowing it to 
be false.  
Although there is some evidence that police 
officers, perhaps like members of any organization, 
may essentially from time to time play harmless 
pranks on one another particularly on young 
members, ... in my opinion in this case it would be 
speculative to say that this would have occurred or 
could have occurred such as to create a reasonable 
doubt.  
It seems to me what occurred would have been 
beyond the purview of a prank or a joke which would 
normally be harmless. The court must decide the 
case on the evidence before it, and here there is 
simply no evidence of any potential mischief of such 
magnitude.
The evidence is that when asked for an explanation 
as to why he did not attend court as required, the 
accused produced a false document which would 
absolve him.  
In the absence of any other evidence a conclusion is 
inescapable in my opinion as to his culpability.  
[paras. 7-11]
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
DID YOU KNOW...
...that under TITLE 18, PART I, 
CHAPTER 44, §  931 of the United 
States Code there is a federal 
prohibition on the purchase, ownership, 
or possession of body armor by violent 
felons. The section reads:
§ 931 
(a) In General.— Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall 
be unlawful for a person to purchase, own, or possess body 
armor, if that person has been convicted of a felony that is— 
(1) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16); or 
(2) an offense under State law that would constitute a crime of 
violence under paragraph (1) if it occurred within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 
(b) Affirmative Defense.— 
(1) In general.— It shall be an affirmative defense under this 
section that— 
(A) the defendant obtained prior written certification from his or 
her employer that the defendant’s purchase, use, or 
possession of body armor was necessary for the safe 
performance of lawful business activity; and 
(B) the use and possession by the defendant were limited to the 
course of such performance. 
(2) Employer.— In this subsection, the term “employer” means 
any other individual employed by the defendant’s business that 
supervises defendant’s activity. If that defendant has no 
supervisor, prior written certification is acceptable from any 
other employee of the business. 
§  16 of CHAPTER 1 defines a crime of violence as 
meaning “(a) an offense that has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person or property of another, or 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its 
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be 
used in the course of committing the offense. As for 
punishment, § 924(7) of CHAPTER 44 provides that 
“Whoever knowingly violates section 931 shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 3 
years, or both.” 
www.10-8.ca10
Volume 9 Issue 2
March/April 2009
of break and enter of a dwelling house with intent to 
commit an indictable offence, uttering a threat to 
cause bodily harm and possession of a weapon for a 
purpose dangerous to the public peace and sentenced 
to four years in prison.  
The accused appealed his convictions to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that 
his defence was prejudiced and he was denied a fair 
trial because the alleged weapon, a nightstick, was 
lost and unavailable at trial. He submitted that if the 
nightstick had not been lost he would have been able 
to show that the complainant’s description of the 
nightstick was different from its actual appearance.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
argument. “The nightstick was available at the 
preliminary inquiry and defence counsel asked no 
questions of the complainant about it at that time,” 
said the Court. “At the trial, the police officer who 
found the nightstick described it and the discrepancy 
between that description and the description given by 
the complainant was before the trial judge. We can 
see no way in which the [accused’s] case was 
compromised because the actual nightstick was not 
available at the trial.” The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
‘SEXUAL PURPOSE’ OF CHILD 
PHOTOS DETERMINED 
OBJECTIVELY 
R. v. Grant, 2009 BCCA 72 
The accused was convicted in British 
Columbia Supreme Court on one count of 
making child pornography and one count 
of possessing child pornography. A 
cleaning person had found eight Polaroid photographs 
hidden in the floor vent of an apartment where the 
accused had lived. The photographs depicted the anal 
and vaginal areas of a four year old girl who was 
completely naked in six of the eight photographs. The 
photographs were all taken at close range and the girl 
was posed in positions designed to maximize exposure 
of her private parts.  The police also took a tape 
recorded statement from the accused where he 
admitted taking the photographs, did not deny hiding 
them, and told police what he had done was wrong. 
INFERENCE OF POSSESSION 
REASONABLE & 
COMMONSENSICAL
R. v. Chu, 2009 ONCA 121
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld an 
inference of possessing marihuana plants 
— knowledge and control — in the 
absence of evidence from the accused. 
The inference was based on the following: (1)  the 
house was being used only to cultivate marijuana and 
it was virtually uninhabitable because of the 
temperature and smell; (2)  the accused was in the 
house for at least thirteen minutes;  and (3)  the 
accused had a key to the front door. The operation in 
the house was of a size and nature that required 
human “attention” and care. This was a common sense 
observation by the judge and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LOST NIGHTSTICK DID NOT 
RENDER TRIAL UNFAIR
R. v. Serre, 2009 ONCA 108
A man, who had a nightstick in his hand, 
broke into the home of a woman who was 
sleeping. The man said he was looking for 
someone and he left, saying he would 
come back. The woman looked outside the window, saw 
the intruder get into a vehicle occupied by two others, 
and then called police. A couple of hours later the 
vehicle returned and the woman immediately called 
911. When the police attended, they found three 
people at the car including the accused, who was 
sitting in the front passenger seat.  They also found 
a black nightstick poking out from underneath the 
front passenger seat.  
The nightstick was entered as evidence at the 
preliminary inquiry and the victim was shown a 
nightstick that was the same as the one the intruder 
had held during the first confrontation.  She 
described it as about 12 inches long and black. After 
the preliminary inquiry, however, the nightstick went 
missing. At trial, the officer described the missing  
nightstick as black and about a foot-and-a-half long, 
with etching by the grip.  The accused was convicted 
www.10-8.ca
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The accused appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
evidence fell short of establishing that the 
photographs were taken for a “sexual purpose”, within 
the meaning of s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code.  In his 
view, his state of mind could not be inferred from the 
photographs, which were equally consistent with the 
“cute” behaviour of a child “playing freely”.  
Chief Justice Finch, delivering the decision of the 
unanimous court, rejected the accused’s argument.  
Section 163.1(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Criminal  Code  defines 
“child pornography” as “a 
photographic, film, video or 
other visual representation, 
whether or not it was made 
by electronic or mechanical 
means … the dominant 
characteristic of which is 
the depiction, for a sexual 
purpose, of a sexual organ or 
the anal region of a person 
under the age of eighteen 
years.”
“It is settled law that whether the materials have as 
their ‘dominant characteristic’ a ‘sexual purpose’ is to 
be determined objectively,” said Chief Justice Finch. 
“The question is whether a reasonable viewer, looking 
at the pictures objectively and in context, would see 
their dominant characteristic as the depiction for a 
sexual purpose of a sexual organ or the anal region of 
a person under the age of eighteen.”  He continued:
In my opinion, the evidence in this case amply 
demonstrates that, viewed objectively and in 
context, the photographs’ dominant characteristic 
is the depiction of their subject matter for a sexual 
purpose.  The photographs themselves, together 
with the fact they were hidden, and the [accused’s] 
admission that he had done wrong, can lead only to 
the conclusion that there was no innocent purpose in 
their taking. ... [para. 16]  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
"To see what is right, and not to do it, is want of 
courage or of principle." - Lisa Alther 
DELAY IN TAKING BREATH 
SAMPLES EXPLAINED
R. v. Burbidge, 2008 ONCA 765
After being stopped for speeding the 
accused failed an approved screening 
device (ASD) and he was read his rights 
to counsel, cautioned about his right to 
remain silent, and a breathalyzer demand was given. 
He said he wished to speak to duty counsel and was 
transported to the police station 
where he was afforded his right 
to counsel in private. He provided 
two breath samples, both more 
than double the legal limit. 
However, there was another 
driver at the station who was also 
required to provide breath 
samples. This required the 
accused to be taken back and 
forth to cells between the taking 
of each sample. The accused was 
convicted at trial in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice for 
over 80mg%, sentenced to 3 ½ years in jail, and given 
a lifetime driving prohibition. He had thirteen prior 
drinking and driving related offences on his record. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the 37 minute time interval between 
speaking to his lawyer and the taking of the second 
breath sample rendered the sample not being taken as 
soon as practicable. 
Noting that the Criminal Code requires at least a 15 
minute interval between the first and second breath 
samples, the Court of Appeal recognized that the 
phrase “as soon as practicable” means the tests must 
be taken within a reasonable prompt time under the 
circumstances. In this case, the accused had to 
alternate his turn on the breathalyzer with the other 
driver and his samples were taken as soon as 
practicable. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca
Note-able Quote
"A man will fight harder for his interests than for his 
rights."  - Napoleon Bonaparte
 “It is settled law that whether the materials 
have as their “dominant characteristic” a 
“sexual purpose” is to be determined 
objectively. The question is whether a 
reasonable viewer, looking at the pictures 
objectively and in context, would see their 
dominant characteristic as the depiction for 
a sexual purpose of a sexual organ or the 
anal region of a person under the age of 
eighteen.”
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SAFETY SEARCH JUSTIFIED IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WARRANT 
EXECUTION 
R. v. Osanyinlusi, 2008 ONCA 805
Police attended a house to execute a 
search warrant for evidence related to a 
series of robberies. Under the warrant 
police were seeking several items, 
including articles of clothing and things used by the 
person suspected of the robbery. As police were 
about to enter or were entering the house, the 
accused, who was not the robbery suspect but who 
rented a room at the home, attempted to obstruct 
their entry. He was apprehended by the officers and 
handcuffed. An obvious bulge was noted in one of the 
accused’s front pants pockets and a search revealed a 
cell phone and some crack cocaine in individually 
wrapped  pieces. In another pocket he had a roll of 
cash.   Officers also found a small unlocked safe 
sitting in plain view on a chair in an upstairs bedroom 
containing a set of scales, two clear baggies with 
crack cocaine, a set of car keys that fit a motor 
vehicle belonging to the accused in the driveway, and 
an Ohio driver’s licence in the accused’s name. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge upheld the search warrant and found the search 
of the accused lawful. The trial judge stated:
It is a well-recognized principle that a search 
warrant generally authorizes the search of the 
property specified in the warrant. A search warrant 
does not authorize the search of persons found on 
the specified premises or property… The search of 
[the accused’s] person, therefore, was a 
warrantless search. As such the Crown bears the 
onus of justifying the search of the accused and the 
seizure of items in his pockets. 
The Crown is required to 
demonstrate on the balance of 
probabilities that the search 
and seizure were authorized 
by law, and carried out in a 
reasonable manner. [para. 37]
And further:
In the case at bar [the 
officer] was forcefully and 
persistently obstructed by 
the accused in the execution of a search warrant. 
First, by immediately closing the door when 
informed of the search warrant, and secondly, by 
alerting others in the house to the police presence. 
This conduct understandably made the officer 
concerned about being able to safely execute the 
warrant. The situation required an immediate 
response. He handcuffed [the accused] to subdue 
him, and noticed a bulge in his right pocket. In the 
circumstances this reasonably alerted him to a 
possible risk of harm.
[The officer] knew that several other officers were 
behind him entering, or about to enter, the house. 
Based on the information he received on the 
briefing he was aware of the probability of weapons 
such as knives or meat cleavers being in the house. 
At that point he did not know who else was in the 
house, but would have logically assumed the 
presence of others due to the accused calling out to 
inform them of the police presence. At that critical 
moment, and after noting the bulge, reaching into 
the pocket of the accused was a reasonably 
necessary interference with his privacy right in 
order to responsibly perform his police officer 
duty. Though searching pockets is in many 
circumstances considered an intrusive invasion, in 
these circumstances it was an intrusiveness that 
was necessary and minimal for the intended purpose 
of ensuring safety in the execution of the search 
warrant.
Accordingly, I find there was a constellation of 
objectively discernable facts which give rise to 
articulable cause for [the officer] to detain [the 
accused]. The search that followed was reasonably 
necessary both on a subjective and on an objective 
view of all the circumstances. There was a perceived 
and objective risk to officer safety in the context 
of the spontaneous and forceful conduct of [the 
accused] in obstructing the officers in the lawful 
execution of the search warrant. The search was 
brief and conducted in a reasonable 
manner. [paras. 47-49, see R. v. 
Osanyinlusi, 2006 CanLII 21070 (ON 
S.C.) for the trial judge’s comments]
The accused was convicted by a jury 
of possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking and was 
sentenced to two years 
imprisonment to be served in the 
community.
“[T]he officers who attended the … 
residence were lawfully present in the 
execution of a valid search warrant, 
which authorized the search of the 
entire premises. They were further 
entitled to detain and search the 
[accused] at the entrance to the 
premises as a person who appeared 
to be obstructing the execution of the 
warrant.”
www.10-8.ca
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The accused appealed arguing, among other grounds, 
that the trial erred in admitting evidence obtained by 
a s.8 Charter breach because the warrant was invalid. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the warrant, thus 
the accused’s detention and search were lawful. The 
Court of Appeal stated:
It follows that the officers who attended the … 
residence were lawfully present in the execution of 
a valid search warrant, which authorized the search 
of the entire premises. They were further entitled 
to detain and search the [accused] at the entrance 
to the premises as a person who appeared to be 
obstructing the execution of the warrant…. [para. 
12] 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.ca
ARREST STANDARD DOES NOT 
REQUIRE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR 
CONVICTION
 R. v. Nguyen, 2009 ABCA 38 
Police were dispatched at about 3:00 
p.m. to a firearms incident at a shopping 
mall. Shots had reportedly been fired 
and two vehicles occupied by younger 
Asian males, including a newer black BMW, were said 
to be involved. The BMW’s license plate number 
matched that of the accused’s. About twenty minutes 
later police conducted a high risk vehicle stop on the 
accused’s BMW. Once he exited his vehicle, he was 
handcuffed, placed in a police car, advised he was 
under arrest for weapons 
offences and was 
Chartered and cautioned. 
The accused’s person and 
clothing were swabbed for 
evidence of gunshot 
residue, as was his BMW 
and a pair of fingerless 
gloves found in the trunk. 
Gunshot residue was found 
on the accused’s right hand 
and right side of his face, on the gloves, on both the 
interior and exterior of the driver’s side door, as well 
as on the driver’s seat. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench police 
testified the vehicle was stopped and the accused was 
arrested because he was driving a black BMW with a 
license plate matching a vehicle believed to be 
involved in the shooting and there was a bullet hole in 
its rear window. The accused was subsequently 
convicted of two firearms offences arising out of the 
shooting.
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
suggesting, among other grounds, that the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to believe the driver of 
the BMW had committed an indictable (weapons) 
offence since they said they believed the BMW had 
also been shot at. And just because the police 
believed the BMW had been involved in the shooting, 
that potential involvement in a crime did not meet the 
required threshold of reasonable grounds to arrest 
the driver. The arrest, he contended, was therefore 
unlawful and the search for gun residue as an incident 
to arrest was illegal and thus unreasonable under s.8 
of the Charter. 
The Court, however, rejected the accused’s argument. 
“In order to arrest without a warrant, a police officer 
must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
the suspect has committed an indictable offence,” 
said the Court. “The test has subjective and objective 
elements [and] police are not required to establish a 
prima facie case for conviction.”  On this point the 
Court stated:
It is both subjectively and objectively reasonable 
and probable that the young Asian male driver of a 
vehicle with a bullet hole in the back windshield, 
which has a license plate and characteristics 
matching those of a vehicle involved in a 
shooting 20 minutes prior, committed a 
weapons offence. That the BMW was 
likely shot at does not in anyway diminish 
the probability that someone in the BMW 
was also a shooter, given the information 
available to the police. It must be 
remembered that eye-witnesses to the 
shooting indicated that the shooter 
associated with the BMW fired multiple 
shots at those associated with the 
Honda. [para. 33]
Since the accused’s arrest was lawful the trial judge 
properly found that the search for gun residue was 
properly conducted as incident to arrest.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“In order to arrest without a warrant, a 
police officer must have reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe the 
suspect has committed an indictable 
offence. ... Police are not required to 
establish a prima facie case for 
conviction, only reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest.”
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JUDGE NOT REQUIRED TO 
ENDORSE DYNAMIC CDSA 
SEARCH
R. v. Perry & Richard, 2009 NBCA 12 
The police received reliable information 
that the accused was trafficking in 
cocaine and was in unlawful possession of 
a handgun. They conducted surveillance 
on him and swore an information 
to obtain a search warrant under 
the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) to 
search his home. The 
information to obtain read, in 
part, that a rapid and effective 
entry of the residence without 
announcement was needed to 
secure the evidence and for 
officer safety, but an 
endorsement for the no-knock 
was not specifically requested 
nor obtained. Police met to plan 
the warrant’s execution and a 
battering ram was used to force entry. Officers 
entered, guns drawn, and yelled “police.” The accuseds 
Perry and Richard, the only two occupants of the 
house, were arrested. They both were charged with 
several drug, firearm, and other offences. 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the judge 
ruled the evidence was obtained in the course of an 
unreasonable search, contrary to s.8 of the Charter. 
In her view, the "no knock" entry was unreasonable 
because the issuing judge had not endorsed the 
warrant to authorize such an entry. She concluded 
that in the absence of exigent circumstances a 
"dynamic" or "no knock" entry 
must be endorsed by the issuing 
judge before one is permitted. As 
well, the trial judge refused to 
allow the Crown to lead evidence, 
other than what was explained in 
the information to obtain, to 
justify the "no knock" entry. The 
evidence was excluded the 
evidence under s.24(2) of the 
Charter and the Perry and 
Richard were acquitted.  
The Crown appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in holding that a 
no knock endorsement by a judge was required and in 
excluding relevant evidence offered for the purpose 
of explaining the need for a no knock entry in this 
case. 
Before rendering its opinion, the Appeal Court made 
it clear that this was a search for items that could be 
easily destroyed or hidden and one of the items, the 
handgun, could create a 
potential danger to police. 
This was not a warrantless 
residential search, did not 
involve a search for a 
marihuana grow operation, 
nor was it a search 
warrant to which special 
rules applied, such as a 
lawyers office or media 
outlet. Rather, this was 
the type of search that 
obligated compliance with  
statutory requirements 
and proper announcement 
prior to entry, except in exigent circumstances. 
“Included within the definition of exigent 
circumstances are the need to prevent the 
destruction of evidence and considerations of officer 
safety and the safety of persons within the 
premises,” said Justice Bell, authoring the unanimous 
judgment. “If evidence is led that an announcement by 
the police, prior to entry, might result in the 
destruction of evidence, risks to officer safety, or 
risk to the safety of someone on the premises, then 
no notice is necessary. The reasonableness of the 
manner in which the search is conducted can only be 
measured by an assessment of the circumstances 
within the knowledge of 
the police prior to, and 
during the course of the 
search.”
The Court concluded 
that prior authorization 
(endorsement) was not 
required for a dynamic 
or "no knock" search. 
Justice Bell stated:
“It does not take much imagination to think of 
situations where circumstances change after 
the issuance of a warrant, which either 
eliminate the need for a "no knock" entry or 
require one which was previously thought 
unnecessary. Following the issuance of the 
warrant, police officers and judges should not 
be required to meet again to address the 
appropriate mode of entry. To impose such a 
requirement upon police and the judiciary 
would result in the micro-management of 
police investigations.”
“Included within the definition of exigent 
circumstances are the need to prevent the 
destruction of evidence and considerations of 
officer safety and the safety of persons within 
the premises. If evidence is led that an 
announcement by the police, prior to entry, 
might result in the destruction of evidence, 
risks to officer safety, or risk to the safety of 
someone on the premises, then no notice is 
necessary”
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[T]here is no legislative provision which requires or 
permits such an endorsement. No doubt for good 
reason. It does not take much imagination to think 
of situations where circumstances change after the 
issuance of a warrant, which either eliminate the 
need for a "no knock" entry or require one which 
was previously thought unnecessary. Following the 
issuance of the warrant, police officers and judges 
should not be required to meet again to address the 
appropriate mode of entry. To impose such a 
requirement upon police and the judiciary would 
result in the micro-management of police 
investigations. The development 
of the law should not sanction the 
management of police operations 
by the judiciary except where 
necessary in the course of 
fulfilling judicial functions. I do 
not consider the pre-
determination of the method by 
which police are to exercise their 
discretion and respond to 
changing circumstances in 
executing the search of a 
suspect's premises to constitute part of the 
judicial function. [at para. 6]
And further:
I can find no authority for the proposition, in either 
the statute law or at common law, that an issuing 
judge has the authority to determine, a priori, 
whether a "no knock" entry will be permitted in 
cases involving a search with warrant of a suspect's 
premises or residence. In the present case, 
information on oath was laid before a judge setting 
out the suspect's alleged implication in serious 
criminal conduct. Such alleged criminal conduct, 
supported by oath, was not a feature in any of the 
media and law firm cases to which reference has 
been made. The alleged criminal conduct involved 
possession of contraband that could be easily 
disposed of and one item, a handgun, that presented 
a potential danger to police officers. [para. 17]
The Court ruled that, unlike the 
provisions Parliament enacted 
following the Supreme Court’s 
Feeney decision now requiring 
prior judicial authorization for 
unannounced entries to arrest 
(s.529.4 Criminal Code), there is 
no similar requirement in 
relation to the execution of a 
search warrant under the 
CDSA. The common law continues to occupy the field 
in these situations. And the reasonableness of a "no 
knock" entry, like the reasonableness of the search 
itself, is subject to scrutiny in the “manner” the 
search was carried out. “This reality obviates the 
need for prior judicial authorization for a no knock 
entry,” said Justice Bell. “Trial judges are required 
to assess the allegation of unreasonableness, 
including the method of entry, based upon all of the 
evidence available. In determining the 
reasonableness of a search, trial 
judges are not limited to the 
information available to the 
issuing judge but must consider all 
evidence available to the police at 
the relevant time(s).”
In this case the trial judge was 
unable to fully assess the 
reasonableness of the "no knock" 
search because she limited the 
police testimony on the voir dire. 
In allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial Justice 
Bell stated:
I am of the opinion trial judges are required to 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 
search in order to determine whether exigent 
circumstances exist for a "no knock" entry and 
whether the search (including the entry) was 
conducted in an unreasonable manner. Police are to 
be given full opportunity to explain their actions. In 
assessing whether exigent circumstances exist to 
justify a "no-knock" entry, the Court must not limit 
the testimony of police officers, or anyone else for 
that matter, to the evidence contained in the 
information to obtain. The whole of the 
circumstances within the knowledge of the police 
must be available to the trial judge. I am of the view 
the trial judge erred in limiting the police officer's 
testimony. As a result of that error, she could not 
make an informed decision on whether or not 
exigent circumstances existed, 
and furthermore, whether the 
accused had succeeded in meeting 
the onus upon them to 
demonstrate that the search was 
conducted in an unreasonable 
manner. [para. 28]
Complete case available at 
www.canlii.org
“I can find no authority for the 
proposition, in either the statute law 
or at common law, that an issuing 
judge has the authority to determine, 
a priori, whether a "no knock" entry 
will be permitted in cases involving a 
search with warrant of a suspect's 
premises or residence.”
“Police are to be given full opportunity 
to explain their actions. In assessing 
whether exigent circumstances exist to 
justify a "no-knock" entry, the Court 
must not limit the testimony of police 
officers, or anyone else for that matter, 
to the evidence contained in the 
information to obtain.”
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JJP OBLIGED TO REFUSE 
TELEWARRANT IF IN-PERSON 
APPLICATION CAN BE MADE
R. v. Nguyen et al., 2009 BCCA 89
Police investigated a tip of a marihuana 
grow operation at a residence with the 
aim of obtaining a search warrant. During 
the investigation a B.C. Hydro security 
officer advised the police about theft of electricity 
at the same address. On a Sunday, an information to 
obtain a search warrant was sworn by way of 
telecommunications under s.487.1 of the Criminal 
Code. In the grounds portion 
of the information the 
officer swore he believed 
the Provincial Courthouse 
was closed and that he was 
unable to access the 
services of a Provincial 
Court Judge or Judicial 
Justice of the Peace. 
Section 487.1 allows search 
warrants to be issued by 
telecommunication where it 
is “impracticable” for the 
informant to appear in 
person before a Provincial 
Court Judge or Judicial Justice of the Peace.   A 
search warrant was granted and police executed it, 
finding 426 plants in various stages of growth. The 
accuseds were charged with production of marijuana, 
possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana, 
and theft of electricity.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the judge had to determine, among other things, 
whether the search warrant was valid. The officer 
testified he knew the courthouse was closed and 
explained that when he telephoned the Judicial 
Justice of the Peace Centre (“JJP Centre”) he was 
told to send his request by fax. The trial judge 
concluded that the officer acted reasonably in the 
circumstances. The warrant application was made on a 
Sunday and he was told by the JJP Centre to fax the 
materials in; it was reasonable for the officer to 
follow this procedure. The trial judge refused to 
quash the warrant and convictions were entered on all 
charges. 
The accuseds then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that 
the telewarrant should not have been issued because 
the officer did not enquire if he could appear in 
person before the JJP. As a result, the accuseds 
submitted their s.8 Charter rights were breached and 
the evidence should have been excluded under s.24(2).  
Justice Kirkpatrick, delivering the judgment of the 
unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
disagreed with the accuseds:
In my opinion, there is no merit in the [accuseds’] 
argument that the trial judge erred in this respect.  
Since the onus is on the person bringing a Charter 
challenge to prove a violation of his rights 
on a balance of probabilities, the onus was 
on the [accuseds] to demonstrate that the 
standard of impracticability was not met. I 
am not persuaded that the trial judge 
erred in failing to set aside the 
telewarrant on the basis that [the police 
officer] did not ask the Centre if a Judicial 
Justice of the Peace was available.  The 
[accuseds] tendered no evidence to 
demonstrate that a Judicial Justice of the 
Peace was available to receive in-person 
applications. The trial judge accepted the 
police officer’s evidence that he called the 
Centre and was told to fax the 
materials.  It is reasonable to infer from 
the evidence that the Centre would advise 
a constable if a justice of the peace was available. 
Furthermore, the Judicial Justice of the Peace who 
signed the telewarrant would be aware of the 
statutory preconditions of telewarrants and would 
be obliged to refuse the application if a justice of 
the peace had in fact been available. [references 
omitted, para. 18]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quotes
"When I found the skull in the woods, the first thing 
I did was call the police. But then I got curious about 
it. I picked it up, and started wondering who this 
person was, and why he had deer horns." - Jack Handy 
(Deep Thoughts)
“It is reasonable to infer from the 
evidence that the Centre would 
advise a constable if a justice of 
the peace was available. 
Furthermore, the Judicial Justice of 
the Peace who signed the 
telewarrant would be aware of the 
statutory preconditions of 
telewarrants and would be obliged 
to refuse the application if a justice 
of the peace had in fact been 
available.”
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911 CALL ADMISSIBLE AS 
EVIDENCE 
R. v. Liang, 2009 ABCA 2
The complainant and her current 
boyfriend were at home when they heard 
noises outside a basement window. The 
complainant went upstairs to investigate 
and saw someone running from the window while her 
current boyfriend hid in the bathroom. The 
complainant phoned 911 and asked for the police to 
come. On the 911 tape the caller gave her name and 
address and said she was “having problems with her 
ex”, who she identified as the accused. The caller said 
the accused was knocking at the door and screaming 
and banging noises were heard on the tape. The 
complainant saw the intruder, thought it was her 
ex-boyfriend, the accused, but was not certain of 
this. From the bathroom, her current boyfriend heard 
screaming and the door being kicked. The attending 
police officer saw footprints on a door to the home 
and stab marks on the bathroom door. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench a voir 
dire was held to determine the admissibility of a tape 
recording of the 911 call. The complainant could not 
confirm that it was her voice on the tape nor did the 
Crown call a witness to authenticate the tape or to 
confirm when it was recorded. The trial judge found 
that the circumstances of the call were not conducive 
to fabrication or concoction and held it was the 
complainant who made the call and it was made on the 
night in question. 
The trial judge ruled that she was unable to accept 
the unsworn tape “in favour of sworn testimony at 
trial...to the extent that there may be a conflict” but 
that she had to look at all of the evidence, and the 
tape was a piece of evidence that she could consider 
(together with all of the evidence). Relying primarily 
on the complainant’s testimony at trial, which was 
completely consistent with the statements and sounds 
on the 911 tape, the trial judge was satisfied on the 
totality of the evidence that it was the accused who 
broke into the home. He was convicted of being 
unlawfully in a dwelling house with intent to commit an 
indictable offence contrary to s.349(1) of the 
Criminal Code and mischief.
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the 911 tape without evidence of 
the substantial accuracy of it. He contended that the 
tape should not have been admitted without evidence 
from the maker of the tape as to its accuracy. Justice 
Costigan, delivering the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal, rejected the accused’s submission. “It is not 
necessary to establish either the integrity of a tape 
or a speaker’s identity before a tape can be 
admitted,” he said. “A video tape is admissible once it 
is established the tape was not altered or changed 
and it depicts the scene of the crime.” Here, the 
contents of the tape were consistent with the 
complainant’s testimony at trial as well as that of her 
current boyfriend and the investigating police 
officer. As well, the trial judge found that the 
complainant was the caller on the tape and it was open 
to her to conclude on all of the evidence that the tape 
was admissible. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
INTERACTION NON-COERCIVE: 
CHARTER RIGHTS RESPECTED
R. v. Jeanes, 2009 ONCA 96
Following a series of break and enters an 
off-duty police officer observed a 
distinctive boot tread on the accused’s 
shoe that linked him to the break ins. In 
a friendly and conversational tone the officer said to 
the accused, "I would like to see the bottom of your 
boot". At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice the police officer testified that he had not 
arrested or restrained the accused and no evidence 
was offered to challenge the police officer's evidence 
or to support the contention that the accused had 
been subject to a physical or psychological restraint.
The trial judge found that the police officer "calmly 
approached [the accused], identified himself by name 
as a police officer and asked if he could see the tread 
pattern. He did not order [the accused] to show it to 
him. [The accused] voluntarily complied not once but 
twice with this request."
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
submitting that his Charter rights were breached, 
however, was rejected. “On the evidence, it was open 
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to the trial judge to make these findings and to 
conclude that the [accused] had voluntarily complied 
with a non-coercive request and that he had not been 
subject to any significant physical or psychological 
restraint nor had there been any violation of his 
bodily integrity or reasonable expectation of privacy,” 
said the Court. “Those findings are fatal to the 
[accused’s] contention that the rights guaranteed by 
ss.8, 9 and 10 of the Charter were violated.” The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DUAL PURPOSE INCIDENTAL 
SEARCH LAWFUL SO LONG AS 
ONE PURPOSE REASONABLE
R. v. Chubak, 2009 ABCA 8
 
Two officers responded to an area where 
a young man had been beaten and 
stabbed and saw a group of young people 
gathered in the vicinity. As the patrol 
car turned around, a white Honda Prelude, driven by 
the accused, pulled up to the group. The officers 
parked their vehicle near the group facing the 
Prelude, exited the vehicle, and approached. The 
accused was seen to grab something that was black 
with an orange top from the backseat of the Prelude. 
An officer then approached the Prelude and observed 
the item, a large can of bear spray, between the 
accused’s legs. He was attempting to remove it from 
its black case. The accused was removed from the 
vehicle and arrested for possession of a prohibited 
weapon while the passenger was arrested for 
possession of a weapon for a 
purpose dangerous to the 
public peace.
The accused was searched 
and police found a wallet 
containing $1,090 as well as a 
folding knife. The accused’s 
vehicle was then searched 
for other weapons and a 
collapsible baton and another 
knife were found. A number 
of ringing cell phones were 
located and a small blue 
container on the driver’s side 
door was found with crack cocaine in it. Police 
continued their search and a white envelope 
containing more crack cocaine and a digital scale was 
found behind a loose ash tray and stereo 
compartment.  The accused was subsequently charged 
with possessing a controlled substance, unlawfully 
possessing property, possessing a prohibited weapon 
x 2, and possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous 
to the public peace.
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the officer 
testified that, after finding the large sum of money 
and the ringing cell phones, he determined that they 
may be dealing with “individuals that are dealing drugs 
and are arming themselves with weapons.” As a result 
he expanded his search of the vehicle.  The trial judge 
concluded that the search of the accused’s person 
was lawful as incident to the arrests for possession of 
a prohibited weapon and possession of a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace, and for security 
purposes. The police had been called in relation to the 
stabbing so it was reasonable for them to also be 
concerned about potential weapons in the vehicle. 
Thus, the search for further weapons in the vehicle 
was also lawful as an incident to arrest. However, the 
trial judge ruled that opening the small blue container 
was a general search, which was not sanctioned by law 
and breached the accused’s s.8 Charter right. The 
drug evidence was excluded. The Crown offered no 
further evidence and suggested all charges be 
dismissed. Hence, the accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittals to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal which was tasked with 
determining whether the police breached s.8 of the 
Charter.  Section 8, 
which provides that 
“everyone has the right 
to be secure against 
unreasonable search and 
seizure,” will not be 
violated if a search is 
authorized by a 
reasonable law and is 
carried out in a 
reasonable manner. And 
although a warrantless 
search is prima facie 
unreasonable, a search 
“When police search a person as part of a search 
incident to arrest, they are not precluded from 
looking at, and taking into their control and 
custody, anything they find on the arrested 
person, so long as the search is for a reason 
related to the arrest. ... The same principles apply 
to searches conducted incident to arrest that are 
not of the arrested person, but of the arrested 
person’s immediate surroundings, including the 
automobile that the arrested person was extracted 
from at the time of the arrest.”
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incidental to arrest at common law qualifies as an 
exception to the rule, with some limitations. There 
are three justifiable reasons for conducting a search 
incidental to arrest: ensuring police and public 
safety; protecting evidence from destruction; and 
discovery of evidence to be used at trial. 
In this case the accused conceded that the arrest 
was lawful and that the search for weapons incidental 
to arrest was also lawful, but complained that the 
search exceeded the scope of the common law once it 
expanded to include a search for drugs and involved 
the small blue container. In his view, once the search 
expanded to include a search for drugs, it no longer 
qualified as a lawful search incidental to arrest, 
violating his s.8 Charter right against unreasonable 
search and seizure. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that the officers were not restricted to 
searching for weapons but were entitled to search for 
anything that would explain the accused’s possession
of bear spray, such as evidence of a drug operation. 
In determining whether a search is truly incidental to 
an arrest a subjective and objective analysis is 
required. Subjectively the officer must have one of 
the purposes for a valid search incident to arrest in 
mind when the search is conducted. And objectively 
the officer’s belief that this purpose 
will be served by the search must be 
reasonable. “Therefore, in order for 
the search in this case to be lawful, 
the officers must have been 
searching for purposes of safety, to 
preserve evidence, or to find 
evidence to support the arresting 
charge,” said Justice Ritter for the 
majority. “If their search was for 
one of those reasons, it must have 
also been objectively reasonable.” 
And a search will still be lawful if 
“searching officers … subjectively have more than one 
reason for the search, so long as one of the reasons 
is objectively justified as incidental to arrest, … the 
entirety of the search can be connected to that 
reason.”
In this case the officer said police were looking for 
weapons and drugs after discovering the money and 
cell phones. He testified that he believed the blue 
container did not contain a weapon, but there was no 
evidence as to the officer’s subjective belief that it 
could not have possibly contained evidence in support 
of the weapons charge. “Therefore, the entire fruit 
of the constables’ dual purpose search in this case is 
admissible, even in the absence of [the officer] 
articulating a subjective reason that would justify the 
search,” said Justice Ritter. He continued:
Moreover, what was being searched was the car, as 
part of the immediate surroundings of an arrested 
person. When police search a person as part of a 
search incident to arrest, they are not precluded 
from looking at, and taking into their control and 
custody, anything they find on the arrested person, 
so long as the search is for a reason related to the 
arrest. For example, police may find a piece of paper 
on the arrested person. That piece of paper may be 
totally innocuous, or it may disclose that the 
arrested person just purchased a knife or firearm 
which has not yet surfaced in the search. It may also 
disclose that the arrested person was involved in a 
crime unrelated to the search. If it does, and even 
if the police were beginning to suspect that the 
arrested person was involved in such a crime, the 
piece of paper is admissible in evidence as a fruit of 
a search incident to arrest.
The same principles apply to searches conducted 
incident to arrest that are not of the arrested 
person, but of the arrested person’s 
immediate surroundings, including the 
automobile that the arrested person 
was extracted from at the time of 
the arrest. This is particularly the 
case when weapons have already been 
found as part of that search.
Given the circumstances in this case, 
in combination with [the officer’s] 
evidence, to find that the subjective 
reasons for searching changed in any 
tangible way over the course of the 
constables’ search would impose a 
conceptual and temporal disconnect 
that did not exist. The law must not become so 
complex that it prevents police officers from 
administering their duties. When persons are 
lawfully arrested, their expectation of privacy is 
reduced so that a search of their immediate 
surroundings conducted contemporaneously with the 
arrest is to be expected, so long as the search has 
a purpose related to the arrest. Here, that purpose 
existed, both subjectively and objectively. That the 
search included the small blue container does not 
“When persons are lawfully 
arrested, their expectation of 
privacy is reduced so that a 
search of their immediate 
surroundings conducted 
contemporaneously with the 
arrest is to be expected, so long 
as the search has a purpose 
related to the arrest. subjective 
element.”
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negate its legitimacy. [paras. 19-
21]
The majority also recognized that 
pretextual searches will not meet 
the requisite subjective or the 
objective elements of the test. 
But this search was not based on 
pretext. “The circumstances of the arrest give 
credence to concerns regarding weapons and officer 
safety,” said Justice Ritter. “This was not a traffic 
stop that cloaked the true motivation for the search”: 
The trial judge appears to have recognized that 
both a subjective and objective basis for a search 
was required. However, he failed to apply the law 
that says a dual purpose search meets the 
subjective part of the test, so long as one of the 
purposes - here the instigating and ongoing purpose 
- meets the subjective element. Had he done so, he 
would have found the search to be lawful and would 
have admitted the fruit of that search. [para. 23]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered on the controlled substance charges and 
unlawful possession of property.
A Different View
Justice Berger disagreed with the majority. In his 
view, “the dual purpose foundation relied upon is … an 
inadequate basis upon which to render lawful the 
warrantless search for drugs in the small blue candy 
container” and he did not agree that “a lawful search 
incidental to arrest invariably immunizes a temporally 
concurrent separate and distinct search carried out 
for a different purpose.” Nothing about the blue 
container suggested “anything weapon like.” The 
search had been expanded to a drug search with a 
deliberate and precise purpose in mind unrelated to 
the search for weapons incidental to arrest. Justice 
Berger stated:
If an officer’s sole purpose is to search for weapons 
incidental to arrest (including a search of the 
arrested person’s immediate surroundings) and s/he 
comes upon drugs, the contraband is not rendered 
inadmissible at a subsequent trial on a charge of 
possession or trafficking. But if the officer embarks 
upon a search for drugs unrelated to the reason for 
the arrest, this second separate and distinct 
purpose will not serve to justify the warrantless 
search. In the case at bar, the search of the small 
blue candy container cannot be said to 
have served the officer’s purpose in 
searching for weapons nor, given his 
testimony, would it be reasonable for 
him to entertain such a belief. He 
opened the container to search for 
drugs without any reasonable prospect 
of securing evidence of the offence 
for which the accused had been 
arrested. At that point, the search for weapons had 
been suspended, albeit temporarily. It follows that 
an infringement of s. 8 of the Charter, in my opinion, 
is made out.
………
In the instant case, there is no suggestion 
whatsoever in the evidence that the police could not 
effectively and safely apply the law by seeking a 
telewarrant to search the vehicle for drugs. [paras. 
32-34]
However, Justice Berger would admit the evidence 
under s.24(2). The drugs found in the vehicle were 
real and non-conscriptive and admissibility would not 
impact trial fairness. There is a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a vehicle than in a home or office and the 
search was not especially obtrusive. As well, “the 
police were dealing with a potentially volatile situation 
while investigating a serious crime of violence in the 
presence of a large group of individuals in the early 
morning hours. Furthermore, the accused “was armed 
with bear spray and it was necessary for the police to 
respond immediately without much opportunity to 
reflect upon the legality of the search.” And finally, 
the evidence was crucial to the Crown’s case. In 
holding that the administration of justice would not 
be brought into disrepute, Justice Berger said:
[T]he search for firearms had been suspended, 
albeit temporarily, when the officer came upon the 
blue container. In my view, the search for weapons 
was renewed immediately after the contraband was 
discovered in that container. The additional 
contraband later found incidental to that resumed 
search, in my opinion, was the product of a lawful 
search incidental to arrest. After all, one could 
reasonably anticipate that the search for weapons 
would have extended to a search of the ashtray and 
stereo compartment whether or not drugs had been 
discovered in the blue container. [para. 40]
Having found the evidence admissible, Justice Berger 
agreed that a new trial should be ordered 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“[A] dual purpose search meets 
the subjective part of the test, so 
long as one of the purposes - 
here the instigating and ongoing 
purpose - meets the subjective 
element.”
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SINGLE PHOTO VIEWING BY 
OFFICER OK IN RECOGNITION 
CASE
R. v. Bob, 2008 BCCA 485
On the same day a red mountain bike was 
stolen from a residence a police officer 
responding to an unrelated call saw a 
man on a red bicycle.  As the officer was 
going to approach the man to speak with him he was 
about “90 to 95 percent sure” it 
was the accused, who was wanted 
on an outstanding warrant. The 
officer said he was 10 to 15 feet 
from the man when he first saw 
him, and had him in view for five 
to ten seconds before the man 
began to ride away on the bicycle. 
The officer yelled for him to 
stop but the man kept riding, 
followed by the officer in his 
police car. The man eventually 
dropped the bike and fled on 
foot, but the officer could not 
catch him. The officer was able 
to give a limited description of the man. He had 
pronounced lips and cheek bones and was wearing a 
baseball cap, sunglasses, a hooded top with the hood 
down, and dark pants. The bicycle was seized and the 
officer returned to the police station where he looked 
at a police photo of the accused on the computer to 
confirm that the man he saw on the bicycle was indeed 
the accused. The photo made up his mind and he was 
at that point “completely satisfied” that it was the 
accused on the bicycle.  
At trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the officer 
identified the accused as the 
man he saw on the bicycle. 
The officer said that he had 
dealt with the accused on 
four or five occasions when 
he had been arrested by 
other officers. The accused’s 
mother testified that the 
accused had three relatives 
who resembled him, and who 
had been mistaken for him in the past when they were 
all at school.  The accused, however, did not testify. 
His mother’s evidence did not sufficiently undermine 
the officer’s on scene identification, which had been 
reinforced or confirmed by the photograph. And 
although he acknowledged the need to be cautious 
about in-court identification evidence, the judge 
observed that the officer knew the accused prior to 
the offence and had “very substantial prior dealings” 
with him. The officer not only recognized the accused 
as the person with the bicycle, but also in the 
courtroom and from prior 
dealings.  The trial judge was 
satisfied the officer’s 
identification was reliable and 
offered proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that that 
person on the bicycle was the 
accused. The accused was 
convicted of possessing stolen 
property under $5,000.
The accused then appealed to 
the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal based on the frailties of 
eyewitness identification. He 
submitted the trial judge misapprehended the 
officer’s evidence in his identification of the accused 
riding the bicycle. He also argued the judge failed to 
apprehend the defective nature of the evidence in 
confirming identification by viewing a single 
photograph of him and incorrectly placed too much 
weight on the in-court identification. 
Justice Neilson, delivering the opinion for the Appeal 
Court, noted that this was not a case of identification 
but rather a case of recognition. “There is a 
significant difference between 
cases in which a witness is 
asked to identify a stranger 
never seen by him before the 
offence, and cases in which a 
witness recognizes a person 
previously known to her,” she 
said. “While caution must still 
be taken to ensure that the 
evidence is sufficient to prove 
identity, recognition evidence is 
generally considered to be more 
“[I]t is well known that an identification 
procedure that singles out the accused as a 
suspect is problematic. This is why an 
identification arising from showing a witness 
one photograph, instead of conducting a 
proper photo lineup, is considered 
prejudicial and given little weight. However, 
this concern does not arise to the same 
extent when the person identified is already 
known to the witness.” 
“There is a significant difference between 
cases in which a witness is asked to 
identify a stranger never seen by him 
before the offence, and cases in which a 
witness recognizes a person previously 
known to her. While caution must still be 
taken to ensure that the evidence is 
sufficient to prove identity, recognition 
evidence is generally considered to be 
more reliable and to carry more weight 
than identification evidence.”
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reliable and to carry more weight than identification 
evidence.” She continued:
Here, the trial judge was clearly aware of that 
distinction, and viewed this as a case of 
recognition.   There was evidence to support that 
approach. There was no suggestion at the trial that 
[the officer] was not a credible witness. He had had 
previous dealings with [the accused].   He had an 
adequate chance to observe him with the bike, and 
he was 90-95 percent sure that he was the man he 
saw. He knew that there was a warrant out for [the 
accused’s], and was sure enough of his identity that 
he tried to stop him on that basis.  He was able to 
describe [the accused’s] unique facial features, 
based on his previous dealings.  [para. 14]
In this case, the officer had not conclusively 
identified the accused when he saw him with the bike. 
Rather, this was a sequential identification, with a 
qualified positive identification at the scene and 
confirmed later by the photograph.  In rejecting the 
view that the trial judge erred in accepting 
identification evidence that was based in part on 
viewing a single photograph, Justice Neilson stated: 
 
[I]t is well known that an identification procedure 
that singles out the accused as a suspect is 
problematic.  This is why an identification arising 
from showing a witness one photograph, instead of 
conducting a proper photo lineup, is considered 
prejudicial and given little weight.  However, this 
concern does not arise to the same extent when the 
person identified is already known to the witness. 
In this case, [the officer] had a high level of 
certainty that the man he saw was [the accused].  
He only needed to look at [the accused’s] photo to 
raise this to absolute certainty.   The danger of 
implicitly suggesting to a witness that the person in 
the photo was the suspect did not arise. There was 
no point in conducting a lineup.  [paras. 16-17]
And although identification of a stranger by a witness 
for the first time is given little weight at trial, the 
considerations are different when the accused is 
previously known to the witness. The trial judge was 
aware of the need to be cautious in relying on in-court 
identification and understood the identification was 
significantly reinforced by the officer’s previous 
dealings with the accused. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GUNS, BAIL & JAIL: 
BILL C-2 REVIEW
With the recent gang and gun 
violence in the Metro Vancouver 
area some discussion has arisen over 
firearm offences and the applicable bail and 
jail consequences. Last year in May 2008, Bill 
C-2’s provisions came into effect. This Bill, cited as 
the “Tackling Violent Crime Act”, amended the 
Criminal Code in various areas including firearms 
offences. 
As a result of Bill C-2, several offences involving the 
use of restricted or prohibited firearms saw minimum 
penalties increased to five years (for a first offence) 
and seven years (for second and subsequent 
offences). An earlier offence, however, will not be 
taken into account for the purpose of second and 
subsequent offences if 10 years has elapsed between 
the day of earlier conviction and the new conviction. 
Bail hearings for offences involving firearms or other 
weapons now restrict the release of charged persons. 
Where a person is held and brought before a justice 
for one of the applicable firearms or weapons 
offences, the onus shifts to the accused to justify 
release and why they should not be detained. 
Generally speaking, judges must release an accused 
person at a bail hearing (on conditions if necessary) 
unless the prosecutor provides justification, or shows 
cause, why the accused should be kept in custody 
pending trial. A reverse onus provision, like the ones 
now related to specific firearms offences, shifts the 
burden from the prosecutor (to justify detention) to 
the accused (to justify release). In proving whether 
detention/release is justified, criteria a court will 
consider relate to court appearance, protection and 
safety of the public, and maintaining confidence in the 
administration of justice, including the strength of 
the Crown’s case, the gravity of the offence, the 
circumstances of the offence (such as whether a 
firearm was used) and , if a firearm was used, whether 
a minimum punishment of three years or more 
attaches (s.515(10) Criminal Code).  
Where the reverse onus provisions apply and an 
accused is released, the judge must include in the 
record a statement of the reasons for making the 
order. 
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 FIREARMS OFFENCE SENTENCING GRID
Section Offence Old Punishment New Punishment Bail - Reverse Onus?
s.95 Possess loaded prohibited or 
restricted firearm or with readily 
accessible ammunition
Dual offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Summarily
• maximum 1 yr
Dual offence
By indictment
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent 
offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
Summarily
• maximum 1 yr
No-Reverse onus does not apply 
unless accused charged by 
indictment and was under a 
firearms/weapons prohibition order 
at the time. 
(s.515(6)(viii) C.C.)
s.99
s.100
s.103
Trafficking in firearms, 
prohibited devices, ammunition, 
or prohibited ammunition.
Possessing firearms, prohibited 
devices, ammunition, or 
prohibited ammunition for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Unauthorized importation or 
exportation of a firearm, 
prohibited device, or prohibited 
ammunition.
Strictly indictable 
offence
By indictment
• minimum 1 yr
• maximum 10 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 3 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
• second and subsequent 
offences
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
Yes-Reverse onus applies.
(s.515(6)(vi) C.C.)
s.244 Discharging a restricted or 
prohibited firearm with intent
Strictly indictable 
offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
• second and subsequent 
offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
Yes-Reverse onus applies.
(s.515(6)(vii) C.C.)
s.272 Sexual assault with restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Strictly indictable 
offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum 14 yrs
• second and subsequent 
offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum 10 yrs
Yes-Reverse onus applies.
(s.515(6)(vii) C.C.)
s.239
s.273
s.279(1.1)
s.279.1
s.344
s.346(1.1)
Attempted murder with 
restricted or prohibited firearm 
Aggravated sexual assault with 
a restricted or prohibited firearm
Kidnapping with a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Hostage taking with a restricted 
or prohibited firearm
Robbery with a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Extortion using a restricted or 
prohibited firearm
Strictly indictable 
offence
By indictment
• minimum 4 yrs
• maximum life
Strictly indictable offence
• first offence
• minimum 5 yrs
• maximum life
• second and subsequent 
offences
• minimum 7 yrs
• maximum life
Yes-Reverse onus applies.
(s.515(6)(vii) C.C.)
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Of all the appeals heard in 2008, 54% were civil while 
the remaining 46% were criminal. Seven percent of 
those dealt with Charter criminal cases. 
Sixteen of the appeals heard in 2008 were as of right. 
This source of appeal includes cases where there is a 
dissent on a point of law in a provincial court of appeal. 
The remaining 66 cases had leave to appeal granted. 
This is where a three judge panel gives permission to 
the applicant for the appeal to be heard. 
Appeal Judgments
 
There were 74 appeal judgments released in 2008, up 
from 58 in 2007. Five of the 74 decisions last year 
were delivered from the bench while 69 were 
delivered after being reserved. As well, 25 of the 
appeals were allowed while 19 were dismissed. A 
further 38 of the appeals heard were under reserve 
as of December 31, 2008. And the court was more 
unanimous than previous years. In 2008 76% of the 
judgments were unanimous. This is up from 62% 
unanimity in 2007. 
SUPREME COURT HEARINGS RISE 
In its Bulletin of Proceedings: 
Special Edition, “Statistics 
1998 to 2008”, the workload of 
the Supreme Court of Canada 
has been outlined. In 2008, the 
Supreme Court heard 82 
appeals, up from 53 in 2007.  
Case Life Span 
The time it takes to render a judgment from the date 
of hearing is lower than the previous year. In 2008 it 
took 4.8 months for the Court to render a decision, 
down from 6.6 months in 2007.  Overall, it takes an 
average of 16.9 months for the Court to render an 
opinion from the time an application for leave to hear 
a case is filed. This is 2.2 months shorter than it took 
in the preceding year 
(2007). 
Appeals Heard
Of the 82 cases heard in 
2008, British Columbia is 
once again the origin of 
the most appeals of any 
province at 20 (up from 
13 last year), followed by 
Quebec (17), the Federal 
Court of Appeal (12), and Ontario (11). No appeals 
originated from the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
Prince Edward Island, or Newfoundland.
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/pdf/doc-eng.pdf
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 POLICE NEED NOT HOLD OFF 
AFTER DETAINEE EXERCISES 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R. v. McCrimmon, 2008 BCCA 487
The accused was arrested at his home on 
a Saturday morning for sexual assault, 
administering a noxious substance, and a 
number of similar offences.  He was 
advised of the reasons for his arrest and was 
informed of his right to retain and instruct 
counsel.  He was told he could call any lawyer he 
wanted, that he had the right to contact a legal aid 
lawyer, and that there was a 24-hour legal aid 
telephone service available. The accused said that he 
wished to call a lawyer.
He was taken to the police detachment where he gave 
the officer the name of his lawyer.  The officer 
looked-up the lawyer’s telephone number and called 
his office, leaving a message on the 
answering machine. But no attempt 
to find the lawyer’s home 
telephone number was made, nor 
did the accused request this be 
done. Asked if he would like to call 
the legal aid number, the accused 
said that he would, although his 
preference was to speak with his 
own lawyer. The officer called legal aid and the 
accused spoke in private with a lawyer for 
approximately five minutes.  He said he was satisfied 
with having spoken to legal aid and understood the 
advice he had received.  He also said he did not know 
if his lawyer would call back. 
A member of the Major Crime Interview Team, with 
specialized training in interrogation techniques, took 
the accused to an interview room and spoke with him 
for approximately three hours and twenty minutes.  
At the beginning of the interview the accused 
confirmed that he had spoken with a legal aid lawyer 
and said the lawyer had advised him not to say 
anything. The investigator told the accused that he 
did not have to say anything, but that anything he did 
say may be used in evidence.
When the investigator broached the subject of the 
incidents under investigation the accused stated that 
he did not want to discuss them until he had spoken 
with his lawyer.  However, he also said that he did not 
mind speaking with the officer.   Ten minutes later, 
the accused again stated that he wished to speak with 
a lawyer before answering any further questions.  His 
request to be taken back to his cell was declined and 
the investigator engaged him in further conversation. 
As the interview continued, the investigator 
attempted to persuade the accused to discuss the 
incidents under investigation.  Several themes were 
repeated by the investigator, such as the police only 
know one side of the story and there is likely another 
side, and perceptions can change once people have an 
explanation for why someone has committed a crime.  
The officer interspersed his remarks with references 
to what the police knew about the incidents and 
showed the accused pictures of some of the women 
who had been assaulted.
A little more than two hours after the start of the 
interview and after he had been shown photographs 
from a store security camera, the accused 
began to admit his involvement in the 
offences under investigation.  During the 
next hour the accused made a number of 
statements that implicated him in the two 
incidents. Later, in the cell area, the 
accused asked if the lawyer he wanted had 
called back.  The officer said that he did 
not think so. The accused stated that he 
had retained that lawyer only once before in 
connection with an impaired driving charge.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the judge 
found there were no promises or threats made, there 
was no atmosphere of oppression (the interview was 
not grilling and the investigator used a calm tone of 
voice and was not aggressive) and throughout the 
interview the accused was aware of, and understood, 
his right to remain silent. His statements were the 
product of an operating mind and the police treated 
him with courtesy and respect. As a result, the trial 
judge found the Crown had proven the voluntariness 
of the accused’s statements beyond a reasonable 
doubt and they were therefore admissible under the 
common law confessions rule. As well, since the 
statements were voluntary the accused’s s.7 Charter 
right to silence was not breached. And finally, the 
trial judge also rejected the accused’s contention 
“[T]he police are not 
required ‘hold off’ when a 
detainee who has exercised 
his or her right to counsel 
asks to speak with a lawyer 
again”
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that his rights under s.10(b) of the Charter were 
violated when he was denied an opportunity to speak 
with the lawyer of his choice and when questioning 
was continued after he had indicated he wished to 
speak with a lawyer. The accused was convicted on two 
charges of sexual assault and two related charges of 
administering a noxious substance.  
The accused appealed his convictions to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing his statements were 
inadmissible. He contended police continued to 
question him despite his requests to speak with a 
lawyer, to remain silent, and to be taken back to his 
cell. As well, he submitted that he was not able to 
speak with counsel of his choice and that there was an 
atmosphere of oppression that rendered his 
statement involuntary.
Justice Frankel, delivering the opinion of the Appeal 
Court, rejected the accused’s challenges. First, the 
trial judge did not err in concluding the statements 
were voluntary. He considered all the relevant 
circumstances, was alive to the pertinent legal 
principles, and applied them to the facts. The accused 
understood that he did not have to speak with the 
police and that the investigator’s persuasive efforts 
to encourage the accused to speak did not deprive him 
of the ability to make an informed choice to do 
so. And since the statements were admissible under 
the confessions rule there can be no finding of a 
Charter violation of the right to silence in respect of 
the same statement. As for the accused’s s.10(b) 
Charter rights, Justice Frankel stated:
With regard to s. 10(b) of the Charter, I would 
reject [the accused’s] argument that he had a right 
to speak with the lawyer of his choice before being 
interviewed by [the investigator].  … “[T]he right to 
counsel is intended to ensure that detainees receive 
immediate legal advice so that they will be able make 
informed choices in their dealings with the police”.  
Here [the accused] exercised his right to counsel 
before the interview, and expressed satisfaction 
with the legal advice he had received.  There is no 
evidence here that that advice was inadequate… 
Indeed, on several occasions during the interview, 
[the accused] indicated an awareness of his rights.  
In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there 
was a denial of the right to counsel.     [references 
omitted, paras. 20]
And finally, as for the police continuing to question 
the accused after he asked to further speak with a 
lawyer, “the police are not required ‘hold off’ when a 
detainee who has exercised his or her right to counsel 
asks to speak with a lawyer again.” There was no error 
in admitting the accused’s statements and his appeal 
was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.couts.gov.bc.ca
QUESTIONS OUTSIDE 
LEGITIMATE PURPOSE OF 
TRAFFIC STOP FIRST STEP IN 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH
R. v. Nguyen, Nguyen, & Reith, 
2008 SKCA 160
            
A police officer on highway patrol in 
Saskatchewan observed the accuseds 
vehicle travelling at a fairly high rate of 
speed on the TransCanada Highway. This 
area on the TransCanada Highway had 
been the location of numerous drug courier arrests of 
people bringing substantial quantities of marihuana 
from British Columbia to Ontario and the officer had 
frequently been involved in these investigations. The 
vehicle was clocked on radar at a speed of 107 km/h 
in a 100 km/h zone. It was snowing at the time and the 
officer belived the driver was driving too fast for 
road conditions. He pulled the vehicle over. 
D. Nguyen, the driver, appeared nervous as did Reith, 
the front passenger. H. Nguyen was lying down in the 
back seat and appeared to be sleeping. The officer 
detected a heavy smell of cologne, but no smell of 
marihuana. The officer became aware the vehicle was 
rented and obtained the rental agreement together 
with D. Nguyen’s Ontario driver’s licence. The officer 
learned the driver was not a party to the rental 
agreement, but it was in the name of the passenger, 
H. Nguyen, who was licensed in British Columbia. D. 
Nguyen stated that all three accused were acquainted 
with each other as they had played basketball 
together even though there was a five year 
discrepancy in their ages. The officer checked CPIC 
and none of the accused had a criminal record. The 
officer gave D. Nguyen a warning ticket for travelling 
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too fast for road conditions, but 
was suspicious the men were drug 
traffickers.  
D. Nguyen was the first to be 
detained for the drug 
investigation. He was provided 
with his rights to counsel and the 
standard police warning, but said 
he did not wish to contact counsel at that time. He 
said that they were going to Toronto from Calgary to 
visit relatives, but that he did not know when or how 
they were going to get home. When asked if he was 
transporting drugs he said he was not transporting 
anything right now.  
 
The officer then detained H. Nguyen for 
investigation. He did not appear surprised or shocked, 
but was extremely nervous—his voice was shaking and 
he had a dry mouth. He was advised of his rights and 
said he did not wish to call a lawyer. The officer then 
asked him a few questions and was told all three men 
began their trip together in Vancouver and were going 
to check out Toronto. When asked whether there 
were drugs in the vehicle he responded, “I don’t know”.
 
At this point the officer believed he had reasonable 
grounds to arrest all three men for trafficking in 
marihuana because of the inconsistent statements 
provided by the Nguyens as to their travel history, 
the use of a rental car, the nervous behaviour of all 
three men, and the powerful smell of cologne, often 
used to mask the odour of marihuana.  He arrested H. 
Nguyen first for trafficking in a controlled substance 
and then Reith. Reith was read his rights but did not 
request to contact a lawyer. When asked whether 
there were any drugs in the vehicle, he said there 
were lots that belonged to all three men. The officer 
then returned to his vehicle and arrested D. 
Nguyen.  The vehicle was taken to the police 
detachment were it was searched. Nineteen pounds of 
marihuana was seized from four suitcases found in 
the vehicle.
 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the Crown submitted that the warrantless search was 
lawful as an incident to arrest. The trial judge did not 
determine whether the officer had the authority to 
detain either D. of H. Nguyen for investigative 
purposes or to question them. Instead, he found the  
Crown failed to prove the officer had reasonable 
grounds to arrest any of the 
occupants. Although the 
officer may have subjectively 
believed reasonable grounds 
existed, that was not enough. 
The officer lacked objective 
reasonable grounds. “There 
was no smell of marihuana, the 
accused had no previous record, the fact that they 
were nervous and their story as to the reason for 
their journey does not, by itself, establish that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed,” he 
said. The arrest was unlawful and breached s.9 of the 
Charter. The searches that followed were also 
unreasonable and a breach of s.8 and the evidence was 
excluded under s.24(2). 
The marihuana was conscriptive evidence and its 
admission would negatively impact trial fairness. The 
Charter breach was also serious. The officer was not 
acting in good faith. He did not have reasonable 
grounds to conduct a search nor did he attempt to 
obtain a search warrant after the vehicle was seized. 
The trial judge characterized the officer as being 
overzealous in his pursuit of drivers on the 
TransCanada highway where the only initial indicia 
that lead to detention and arrest was the pervasive 
smell of cologne, nervousness, and a car rental 
agreement. In his view the admission of the drugs 
seized, obtained by the illegal search of the vehicle, 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The three men were acquitted of 
possessing marihuana for the purposes of trafficking.
 
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the 
discovery of the marihuana in the vehicle. The Crown 
submitted that the accuseds Charter rights had not 
been violated and the marihuana was admissible. In 
particular, the Crown contended that the trial judge 
failed to consider whether Reith’s confession, after 
the arrest of H. Nguyen and Reith, but prior to the 
arrest of D. Nguyen, gave the officer reasonable and 
probable grounds, at the very least, for that last 
arrest. The Crown therefore argues that the trial 
judge erred in finding that the accused’s rights 
pursuant to either ss.8 or 9 of the Charter had been 
breached. It also argued that, in any case, the judge 
erred in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2). As an 
alternative ground, if the Charter was infringed the 
“Investigative detention will not avoid 
Charter challenge if its purpose is to 
determine whether a crime has been or 
is being committed as opposed to 
determining whether the detainee is 
linked to a recent or on-going crime.”
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evidence should not have been excluded under to s. 
24(2). 
Justice Jackson, writing the majority opinion of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, found an investigative 
detention in the circumstances of this case could not 
be justified. She described the requirements for a 
lawful investigative detention this way: 
The Court in Mann carefully placed strict limits on 
the use of investigative detention.  There must be:  
(i) “a recent or on-going criminal offence”; and (ii) a 
“clear nexus” between the detainee and that 
offence. Having satisfied these two criterion, the 
decision to detain must be “further assessed” 
against all of the circumstances to ensure that the 
detention was reasonably necessary. Investigative 
detention will not avoid Charter challenge if its 
purpose is to determine whether a crime has been 
or is being committed as opposed to determining 
whether the detainee is linked to a recent or on-
going crime. …   
 
Before a police officer can detain a person for 
investigative purposes, there must be some aspect 
of the circumstances, relied upon by the officer, to 
permit a future judicial assessment as to whether a 
crime has been or is being committed or is about to 
be committed, as a first step in the Mann analysis. …  
An ongoing police investigation, a reported crime, or 
an odour of contraband of sufficient strength, as 
examples, might lead a judge to conclude in 
assessing police conduct after the fact that, at the 
point of detention, a crime has been or is being 
committed or is about to be committed.  None of 
these indicia of a recent or on-going criminal 
offence are present in this case. [paras. 13-14]
Here, however, D. Nguyen was initially detained for 
exceeding the speed limit for road conditions, an 
offence in Saskatchewan under The Traffic Safety 
Act.  A police officer may stop a person in relation to 
such an infraction under s.209.1 of The Traffic 
Safety Act. But the police officer, in effecting the 
stop, was not entitled to do what he did in this case. 
Questioning, which goes beyond the legitimate 
purpose of an initial stop, constitutes a new inquiry 
and, absent reasonable grounds, may be the first step 
of an unreasonable search or unreasonable 
detention. When the vehicle was first stopped the 
only activity under investigation was that of 
travelling too fast for road conditions. And when D. 
Nguyen was subsequently placed under investigative 
detention for a crime in relation to drugs, the only 
indicia of criminal activity beyond the speeding 
infraction was excessive nervousness, a strong odour 
of cologne, and a rented car.  These factors, in 
Justice Jackson’s view, were nebulous and ambiguous 
factors and even when taken together did not meet 
the criteria to establish the existence of a recent or 
on-going criminal offence. 
When the officer questioned D. Nguyen whether 
there were any drugs in the vehicle he embarked on a 
BY THE BOOK:
s.209.1 of Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic 
Safety Act - Authority of peace officer to stop and 
request information
(1)  A peace officer may require the 
person in charge of or operating a motor 
vehicle to stop that vehicle if the peace 
officer:
(a) is readily identifiable as a peace officer; 
and
(b) is in the lawful execution of his or her 
duties and responsibilities.
(2)  A peace officer may, at any time when a driver is 
stopped pursuant to subsection (1):
(a) require the driver to give his or her name, date of birth 
and address;
(b) request information from the driver about whether and 
to what extent the driver consumed, before or while driving, 
alcohol or any drug or other substance that causes the 
driver to be unable to safely operate a vehicle; and 
(c) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the driver has consumed alcohol or a drug or another 
substance that causes the driver to be unable to safely 
operate a vehicle, require the driver to undergo a field 
sobriety test.
(3) No person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle 
shall, when signalled or requested to stop by a peace 
officer pursuant to subsection (1), fail to immediately bring 
the vehicle to a safe stop.
(4) No person in charge of or operating a motor vehicle 
shall fail, when requested by a peace officer, to comply 
with the requests of a peace officer pursuant to 
subsection (2). 
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warrantless search that the 
Crown had not established 
was authorized by law. As the 
driver of the car, he had a 
certain expectation of 
privacy and his rights under 
s.8 of the Charter had been 
violated.   H. Nguyen was a 
passenger in the car and he 
had not been stopped for 
speeding. But he was placed in 
a police car and advised that 
he was under investigative 
detention.  There was no 
police authority for this. He 
too was questioned and asked about drugs in the 
vehicle and, as the renter of the car, he would have 
also had some expectation of privacy. Thus, when he 
was questioned about the presence of drugs in the 
vehicle, he was subject to a warrantless search for 
drugs contrary to s.8 of the Charter.    
 
Reith was not placed under investigative detention, 
but was effectively detained without authority when 
he was placed in a separate police car.  He was not 
asked any questions, but was instead arrested without 
reasonable grounds, contravening s.9 of the Charter. 
After Reith said were lots of the drugs in the vehicle 
and that they belonged to all three men the officer 
arrested D. Nguyen and searched the vehicle. But 
Crown did not refer to the Reith statement to 
augment the officer’s reasonable grounds to arrest D. 
Nguyen. It was Crown that made the considered 
choice not to use the Reith statement to support the 
arrest. “A trial judge should not be found to have 
committed an error of law for having failed to 
consider a means of convicting the accused, which was 
effectively taken off the trial judge’s plate by Crown 
counsel,” said Justice Jackson.  “There is no obligation 
on a trial judge to make a better case for the Crown 
than that which was presented.” And she continued:
On appeal, the confession is used for the first time 
to support the arrest of the third individual, and 
thereby confer the authority to search as an 
incident to arrest with consequences for all three 
accused. Upon a review of the transcript, it is 
apparent that the police officer was asked no 
questions about the confession in this context.   
When Crown counsel made submissions to the trial 
judge, the confession is not 
mentioned as a basis for 
the arrest, but is used only 
to avoid suppression of the 
evidence obtained contrary 
to the Charter. We should 
not use the Court’s 
authority to set aside 
acquittals and order a new 
trial on the basis that the 
trial judge committed an 
error of law in such 
circumstances.  [para. 42]
The majority sustained the 
trial judge’s analysis of 
s.24(2) in excluding the 
marihuana and the Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Another Opinion 
 
Justice Smith disagreed with her colleagues. In a 
dissenting judgment she noted the onus is on an 
accused to prove their detention was arbitrary and 
breached s.9 of the Charter. But here, since the 
search of the vehicle was warrantless, it was prima 
facie unreasonable and the onus therefore fell on the 
Crown to demonstrate that the search was reasonable 
and did not infringe s. 8. A search will be reasonable 
if it is authorized by law, the law is reasonable, and 
the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. In 
this case, the Crown said the search was justified as 
a search incident to a lawful arrest. “This common law 
right authorizes the warrantless search of a vehicle 
incident to a lawful arrest, noting that automobiles 
attract no heightened expectation of privacy that 
would justify an exemption from the usual common law 
principles,” said Justice Smith. “The purpose of the 
search must be for a valid objective in the pursuit of 
criminal justice. Such objectives include ensuring the 
safety of the police and the public and the discovery 
of evidence that can be used at the trial of the person 
arrested.” 
 
In this case, there was no question that the purpose 
of the search was to obtain evidence of the presence 
of a controlled drug and that the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner. The only issue left 
to be resolved, in Justice Smith’s view,  was whether 
any of the arrests were lawful. If so, a warrant was 
not required for the search. In her analysis she ruled 
“Before a police officer can detain a person for 
investigative purposes, there must be some 
aspect of the circumstances, relied upon by the 
officer, to permit a future judicial assessment as 
to whether a crime has been or is being 
committed or is about to be committed… An 
ongoing police investigation, a reported crime, 
or an odour of contraband of sufficient strength, 
as examples, might lead a judge to conclude in 
assessing police conduct after the fact that, at 
the point of detention, a crime has been or is 
being committed or is about to be committed.”
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associated with nefarious conduct. Nervousness of 
the vehicle’s driver and passenger could be seen as 
intermediate circumstances. Common sense tells us 
that most people stopped by the police for a traffic 
infraction will display nervousness. In this case, the 
officer testified that the nervousness was extreme 
on the part of both the driver and the front seat 
passenger. These circumstances combined with the 
other factors that [the officer] said made him 
suspicious: renting a car to drive to Toronto from 
Calgary but making the return trip by air, and 
vagueness about travel plans, meet the test, in my 
view, of a “constellation” of factors that raised a 
reasonable suspicion justifying the investigative 
detention. The fact that there was no detectable 
odour of marihuana or evidence of drug 
paraphernalia is irrelevant to this issue, for such 
evidence would likely have provided reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest. [references omitted, 
paras. 85-88]
Justice Smith also noted that the initial detention 
met the other criteria required of an investigative 
detention. It was brief—D. Nguyen and H. Nguyen 
were questioned for only a few minutes—and the 
questions focused directly on the officer’s suspicions. 
They were both advised of their right to remain silent 
and to consult a lawyer. And neither was subjected to 
a search of any kind at this stage of the detention. 
She would not interfere, however, in the trial judge’s 
holding that the arrests of H. Nguyen and Reith were 
unlawful, although she described it as a close call. 
 
But the arrest of D. Nguyen was lawful. The officer 
did have reasonable grounds to arrest him following 
Reith’s statement that there was a large quantity of 
marihuana in the vehicle and that it belonged to all 
three men. And the trial judge failed to consider this 
distinction between the circumstances of D. Nguyen 
and the other two men: 
… it is clear that, by the time he came to arrest Duy 
Nguyen, the facts known to the officer now 
included the overwhelmingly probative fact of David 
Reith’s confession. While it is clear from his 
testimony that the officer believed that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest 
even before hearing that confession, and therefore 
did not, in one sense, “rely” on it as grounds to 
arrest Duy Nguyen, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that this crucial fact was considered 
irrelevant by him and that it did not contribute to 
his subjective belief that he had reasonable and 
the initial stop of the vehicle was not arbitrary—it 
was “perfectly legal”—as the trial judge said—for 
highway traffic purposes. And although the trial 
judge failed to distinguish the grounds available or 
required for an investigative detention, Justice Smith 
found the test for a valid investigative detention had 
been met. She stated:
It is now well established that the police are 
entitled to detain individuals for investigation even 
where they lack reasonable grounds to arrest, 
provided they have what used to be called 
“articulable cause”, “reasonable suspicion”, or 
“reasonable cause to suspect”, and now is referred 
to “reasonable grounds to detain”. …
 
While the judgment in Mann refers to suspicion of a 
“clear nexus between the individual to be detained 
and a recent or on-going criminal offence”, recent 
case law has applied the doctrine to cases where 
on-going criminal activity is, itself, only suspected. … 
There must be more than a “hunch” to support 
reasonable suspicion, which must be reasonably 
founded in a constellation of facts known to the 
police officer. In addition, the detention must be 
brief and limited. 
 
In my view, although the trial judge did not address 
the issue, that test was met on the circumstances of 
this case. The police officer indicated a number of 
circumstances that made him suspicious that the 
respondents were presently engaged in transporting 
drugs and specifically marijuana. Some of these 
were what has been referred to as “red flags”, or 
circumstances that, while often associated with 
drug trafficking, are not necessarily so and are, 
individually, innocuous, i.e., equally consistent with 
perfectly innocent activity. Examples of such 
innocuous indicators include traveling in a rented 
vehicle, traveling east from British Columbia, and 
evidence of making a long trip without overnight 
stops. Such circumstances, although legitimately 
considered in the total context of circumstances, 
cannot, in themselves or cumulatively, constitute 
“suspicious circumstances” since they are equally 
consistent with innocent activity. 
 
However, some of the circumstances relied upon by 
the officer in this case rise above the level of 
innocuousness. The overpowering smell of cologne or 
air freshener permeating the vehicle, known to the 
police officer to be commonly used to mask the 
odour of marihuana, is, in my view, such a 
circumstance. While an innocent explanation is, of 
course, possible, it is considerably more likely to be 
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probable grounds to arrest Duy Nguyen. 
Objectively, of course, this fact clearly tips the 
balance in favour of the reasonableness, and 
therefore the lawfulness, of this final arrest. 
[para. 96]
 
The search of the vehicle that followed was 
therefore a lawful search incident to the arrest of D. 
Nguyen and was therefore reasonable and did not 
breach any of the s.8 rights of any of the accuseds. 
And even if H. Nguyen was unlawfully arrested and 
the arrest breached his rights under s.9 of the 
Charter, the search of the vehicle was lawful and was 
not causally related to H. Nguyen’s arrest. 
Reith’s statement was also not obtained in a manner 
that breached the Charter, even if his arrest was 
unlawful (in the absence of reasonable grounds) and a 
s.9 breach. “The statement was not causally related 
to his arrest, for the same questions were posed to 
the other respondents prior to their arrests, and the 
temporal connection between the arrest and the 
statement was broken by the interviewing event, the 
police caution,” said Justice Smith.  “There is no 
suggestion that the statement was in any way coerced 
or involuntary.” 
 
His confession and the marihuana evidence derived 
from it could therefore not be excluded under 
s.24(2). Since the warrantless search of the vehicle 
was lawful as an incident to D. Nguyen’s arrest, there 
were no s.8 Charter breaches in relation to any of the 
men. Justice Smith would have allowed the appeal, 
admitted the evidence, set aside the acquittals, and 
order a new trial.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
COURT SIDE:
Charter s.8: 
Everyone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure.
Charter s.9: 
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.
USING BREATHALYZER’S MARGIN 
OF ERROR AS ‘REASONABLE 
DOUBT’ WRONG
R. v. Almedia, 2009 ONCA 237
After the accused provided breath 
samples of 102 and 92 mg% he was 
charged with over 80mg%.   At trial in 
the Ontario Court of Justice he 
testified that he had three beers shortly before 
getting behind the wheel.   A witness, associated to 
the accused, supported this evidence.  An expert said 
that if the accused only had three beers his 
breathalyzer readings should have been 50mg%, well 
below the legal limit.  
The trial judge ruled that there was a reasonable 
doubt because the accused’s breathalyzer readings 
were “so close to the line”—only 12mg% over the legal 
limit. “I too was raised in an age where lawyers didn’t 
like the idea of people being convicted by machines,” 
said the judge. “And we used to cut a lot – cut people 
a lot more slack than 12 milligrams percent.”   The 
charge was dismissed.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the accused was not acquitted because of a 
reasonable doubt based on the “evidence to the 
contrary”, but instead because the readings were “so 
close to the line”.  The Appeal Court agreed, holding 
the trial judge made a legal error in presuming a 
margin of error and acquitting because of it. “The 
trial judge’s reasonable doubt seems based on an 
assumption of a margin of error in readings provided 
by breathalyzer machines,” said the Court.  “In our 
view, the trial judge acquitted essentially because he 
was not prepared to accept, as a basis for a 
conviction, a reading that was within, or very close to, 
what the trial judge perceived to be the machine’s 
margin of error.”   Since the trial judge did not 
ultimately determine whether the accused’s evidence 
to the contrary raised a reasonable doubt, the 
acquittal was quashed and a new trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
"This is a court of law, young man, not a court of 
justice."  - Oliver Wendell Holmes
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accused’s appeal. Citing an earlier judgment, the Court 
noted that an arrest will be lawful if there is:
both a subjective and an objective basis for the 
reasonable grounds to arrest the suspect. The 
arresting officer or the officer who directs the 
arrest must believe that he has reasonable and 
probable grounds—the subjective element. Further, 
it must be shown that a reasonable person standing 
in the shoes of the officer would have believed that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed to make 
the arrest -- the objective element…. The police 
officer who must have reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest is the one who decides that the 
suspect should be arrested. The officer who 
actually effects the arrest is entitled to rely on the 
request or instruction of another police officer who 
has the requisite reasonable and probable grounds 
to justify the arrest. It is not necessary that the 
officer who actually performs the arrest form an 
independent judgment that there are reasonable 
and probable grounds. [at para. 8] 
Here, the investigating officer 
subjectively believed that anyone 
leaving the residence was arrestable 
and communicated that belief to the 
arresting officer.  However, this 
broad opinion on arrest was not 
objectively reasonable. Although the 
arresting officer was entitled to rely 
on the investigator’s subjective belief 
that is not all that he was acting on. 
He acquired further information—he 
saw the accused’s vehicle leaving the 
previously closed garage which was 
inferred to show he had some control 
over the home. This observation 
provided the objective grounds for 
believing that there was an offence being committed 
at the residence, and linked those grounds with the 
accused. 
There was no error by the trial judge in concluding 
the arrest was valid. The search of his person and his 
vehicle, and the seizure of his house keys, following 
the arres and the trial judge did not err in the s.24(2) 
analysis. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ARRESTING OFFICER RELYING 
ON MORE THAN INVESTIGATOR’s 
BROAD OPINION 
R. v. Le, 2009 BCCA 14
A police officer obtained a search 
warrant after receiving a faxed report 
from a person contracted by BC Hydro 
to detect electrical theft. When the 
warrant was received, the officer advised her 
colleague, who was keeping the house under 
surveillance, that anybody who exited was arrestable 
for theft of electricity. The surveilling officer 
observed the garage door open and a van come out of 
the residence.  The accused was arrested and his keys 
to the vehicle and the house were seized. He was then 
transported to the police station by a third officer. 
Using the keys seized on arrest the police entered 
the house discovering a 
relatively sophisticated 
marihuana grow operation.  
There were wires running in 
the residence, sophisticated 
venting systems, and a locked 
or somehow barricaded door 
to the basement that 
protected the marihuana 
grow operation.  
At trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the trial 
judge found the accused’s 
arrest lawful and the search 
of his person and vehicle 
valid. The trial judge found 
the police had “ample reasons 
to believe, and had reasonable grounds to believe, 
that the theft of electricity was taking place” at the 
accused’s residence. And although the Crown 
conceded the information to obtain the search 
warrant did not support a nighttime search, the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible under s.24(2) of 
the Charter. The accused was convicted of producing 
marihuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, 
and theft of electricity. He then appealed. 
Justice Levine, delivering the unanimous British 
Columbia Court of Appeal judgment, dismissed the 
“The police officer who must have 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest is the one who decides that the 
suspect should be arrested. The 
officer who actually effects the arrest 
is entitled to rely on the request or 
instruction of another police officer 
who has the requisite reasonable and 
probable grounds to justify the arrest. 
It is not necessary that the officer who 
actually performs the arrest form an 
independent judgment that there are 
reasonable and probable grounds.”
www.10-8.ca
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NO OTHER REASONABLE 
INFERENCE AVAILABLE FROM 
FINGERPRINT
 R. v. Gauthier, 2009 BCCA 24  
A break-in occurred at a trailer 
residence. Somebody had cut the screen 
on the back door and forced it open 
causing damage to it. A gun cabinet in the 
back bedroom was open.  One gun was on the floor and 
another was on the bed, together with shotgun shells, 
a clear glass jar and a Bud Light beer bottle that was 
blue in colour.  In the living room was another firearm 
on the floor, as well as strewn papers and a plant that 
had been knocked over. A rifle, three pairs of 
binoculars, some hunting knives and some clothing had 
been stolen.  The guns had been locked in a case and 
the key to the case had been in a dresser beside the 
table.   When the owner left the residence a day or 
two prior to the break-in there were three red 
Budweiser beer boxes in front of 
the freezer and a blue Budweiser 
box on top of it with some bottles 
in it.   He did not leave the items 
on the bed, including the empty 
beer bottle. The accused’s 
fingerprint was found on the beer 
bottle that was on the bed in the 
master bedroom. 
At trial in British Columbia 
Supreme Court the owner of the trailer testified that 
when his friends visited his home they would bring a 
case of beer, but he did not know who bought the red 
Budweiser case. He said he did not know the accused 
nor did he leave the bottle on the bed or know how it 
came to be there. The trial judge concluded it was 
reasonable to infer that the bottle was left by the 
offender along with other things, such as the gun, 
which were moved in the course of the break-in. She 
rejected the defence’s speculative argument that the 
print may have been left on the bottle at some other 
time and that it may have been brought in either by 
the offender or by one of the owner’s friends. There 
was no evidence the accused was acquainted with any 
of the owner’s friends nor that he handled any of the 
bottles which may have been carried into the 
residence by someone else. The bottle was found on 
the bed beside a gun and other items moved in the 
break-in. The accused was convicted of breaking and 
entering with intent to commit an indictable offence.  
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in applying the 
law of circumstantial evidence in finding him guilty. He 
again submitted that a beer bottle is extremely 
portable and that it could have been brought to the 
trailer by the owner’s friend with whom he was 
associated; or the offender, other than the accused, 
could have brought it with him when he broke into the 
trailer after the bottle had been handled by the 
accused.  
Justice Low, delivering the opinion of the unanimous 
Appeal Court, disagreed. When a guilty verdict is 
based on circumstantial evidence the trier of fact 
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the proven facts:
In my opinion, these theories do not rise above 
speculation.   There is no 
evidence that any friend of [the 
victim] had an association with 
the [accused] or that the 
[accused] might have innocently 
handled the beer bottle at some 
other time and place.  The 
significant facts are that the 
beer bottle was found in the bed 
with items that had been strewn 
around by the intruder.  It might 
or might not have come from the 
beer box that was on the freezer.  But its position 
on the bed with a fingerprint on it clearly linked it 
to the offender and the fingerprint had been placed 
there by the [accused].  No other explanation for 
the presence of the beer bottle on the bed and the 
fingerprint on the bottle reasonably emerges from 
the evidence.
In all the circumstances, the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the proven facts is that 
the [accused] was the person who broke into the 
trailer and who relocated many items in it, including 
the beer bottle.  Without speculation, no other 
conclusion arises.  [paras. 11-12]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“In all the circumstances, the only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from 
the proven facts is that the [accused] 
was the person who broke into the 
trailer and who relocated many items in 
it, including the beer bottle. Without 
speculation, no other conclusion 
arises.” 
www.10-8.ca
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WHAT MAKES YOU AN EXPERT?
What exactly is required for an officer to be qualified 
as an expert witness so that he or she can give an 
opinion as to whether the facts of a case indicate drug 
trafficking? Must the officer show their 
qualifications are superior to, or more extensive or 
specialized than those of the average or ordinary 
police officer? Is formal study required? Or is it 
enough that the officer can provide an opinion which 
is outside the ordinary knowledge and experience of 
the judge or jury?
The recent Alberta Court of Appeal case of R. v. N.O., 
2009 ABCA 75, highlighted this very issue.  In this 
case the Crown sought to have a police witness 
qualified as an expert so he could give an opinion on 
the use, packaging, and distribution of cocaine, 
pricing, paraphernalia, consumption patterns, jargon, 
common street terminology, practices and habits of 
cocaine traffickers, and its observable effects. The 
police witness was a detective with 13 years 
experience. His early drug-related experience was in 
the context of performing a broader policing mandate. 
And he had previously been assigned to a drug-
specific unit for about 14 months. His role broadened 
again, until he was promoted to detective in the drug 
control unit. By the time of trial, he had accumulated 
just under two years of dedicated drug-related 
experience and about 11 years that included, but was 
not limited to, drug-related enforcement. He had 
made about 100 undercover drug purchases and 
received extensive training, some of which was 
specific to drugs and some of which involved drugs, 
e.g. undercover techniques. He also instructed 
courses on undercover techniques. But he had not 
been previously qualified as an expert witness.
 
The trial judge focused on whether the officer’s 
qualifications were superior to, or more extensive or 
specialized than, those of an average experienced 
police officer. She refused to qualify the officer as 
an expert explaining she was given no information to 
rate his expertise against the average, ordinary, 
usual, even well-experienced police officer, let alone 
an expert. The officer had not been peer-reviewed or 
acknowledged for his expertise, and the trial judge 
questioned whether his time as an instructor went 
beyond someone sharing his experience with others. 
And the officer had not been previously qualified as 
an expert. 
 
The Crown appealed the trial judge’s finding on 
whether the officer was an expert. The Alberta Court 
of Appeal unanimously agreed that the trial judge 
erred by focusing on whether the officer’s 
qualifications were superior to or more extensive or 
specialized than those of the average or ordinary 
police officer. This was not the correct test. Instead, 
the trial judge was required to determine whether the 
officer had “the expertise to explain the vagaries of 
the drug trafficking milieu or the customs associated 
with cocaine trafficking so as to assist the trier of 
fact in drawing the appropriate inferences from the 
factual matrix.” As well, she also erred in refusing to 
accept the officer’s qualifications as an expert, in 
part, because he had never previously been qualified. 
The Court said:
Expert evidence is admissible if it is relevant and 
necessary to assist the trier of fact, does not 
violate an exclusionary rule and the proposed 
witness is qualified to give it. 
Relevance is “a threshold requirement”. The opinion 
must “be necessary in the sense that it provide 
information ‘which is likely to be outside the 
experience or knowledge of’” the trier of fact. To be 
qualified as an expert, a proposed witness must be 
“shown to have acquired special or peculiar 
knowledge through study or experience in respect 
of the matters on which he or she undertakes to 
testify”. 
………
It is immaterial how this “special or peculiar 
knowledge” or “special knowledge and experience” 
was acquired. It may be from study or instruction, 
practical experience or observation; formal study is 
not a requirement. There is no bar simply because a 
witness has not been previously qualified.
 
Police witnesses may give expert evidence. In part, 
this is because the “drug trafficking milieu may in 
fact be the subject of a speciality” but police 
witnesses may also have expertise “going beyond 
that of the trier of fact”. [references omitted, 
paras. 19-22] 
Thus, the trial judge used the wrong test in refusing 
to qualify the officer as an expert witness.
“It is immaterial how this ‘special or peculiar knowledge’ or ‘special knowledge and experience’ was acquired.” 
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NO BREACH USING MATCH 
BETWEEN SCENE SAMPLES & SET 
ASIDE DNA ORDER
R. v. Newell, 2009 NLCA 18
The accused was convicted of robbery in 
Newfoundland Provincial Court. He was 
sentenced to one year imprisonment and 
he was ordered to provide a DNA sample 
for the national DNA data bank. He then launched an 
appeal. During the period he was appealing his robbery 
conviction, biological evidence from two commercial 
break and enters was collected and sent for DNA 
profiling and inclusion in the national DNA data bank’s 
Crime Scene Index. Matches were made between the 
DNA profile generated from the biological materials 
from the break-ins to that of the accused. The 
accused’s earlier conviction for robbery was 
subsequently overturned on appeal and the DNA order 
originating from the robbery conviction was set aside.  
Later, an officer applied for two DNA warrants under 
s.487.05 of the Criminal Code to obtain a bodily 
substance from the accused for forensic DNA 
analysis in relation to each break and enter.  The 
earlier DNA matches between the biological samples 
obtained from the break and enters and the accused’s 
known offender DNA provided the grounds for the 
new DNA warrants.
The warrants were served on the accused and he 
agreed to provide the samples. These samples were 
forwarded for comparison with profiles in the Crime 
Scene Index and a positive match was made between 
the samples collected pursuant to the DNA warrants 
and the commercial break-ins. The accused was 
charged with two counts of break and enter under the 
Criminal Code, as well as two breaches of undertaking.
At the trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court on these 
new charges, the accused contended that his rights 
under s.8 of the Charter had been breached and the 
evidence obtained through the DNA warrants was 
inadmissible under s.24(2). The trial judge found 
there had been a breach of 
s.8 of the Charter because 
the blood samples obtained 
pursuant to the DNA warrant 
constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure since it 
was obtained on the basis of information (the match) 
which itself had been obtained pursuant to a DNA 
order subsequently invalidated. The accused’s DNA 
profile, which he was forced to supply as a result of a 
criminal conviction that was subsequently overturned 
on appeal, should not have been in the DNA data bank 
when the DNA warrants were issued. The evidence 
obtained under the DNA warrant was excluded and 
the accused was acquitted. 
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s ruling before 
the Newfoundland Court of Appeal.  It argued that 
when the matches were made during the appeal period 
before the order had been set aside, the accused’s 
DNA profile was legitimately in the Convicted 
Offenders Index and there was therefore no reason 
why the matches could not provide the reasonable and 
probable grounds to apply for the DNA warrant.  The 
accused, on the other hand, submitted that setting 
aside the DNA order revived his privacy interest in 
the previously obtained DNA sample and the 
subsequent use of the information from the sample to 
obtain the warrant was unreasonable.
Justice Barry, writing the decision for the Court, 
noted that s.8 of the Charter protects everyone 
against unreasonable search or seizure. A search will 
be reasonable if it is authorized by law, the law itself 
is reasonable,  and the manner in which the search was 
carried is reasonable. And DNA warrant provisions 
have been found to be constitutional. So the question 
the Appeal Court was left to answer was whether a 
Charter violation occurred when information derived 
from a DNA sample after the original DNA order had 
been set aside was used to support the DNA warrant.  
“The Charter right to privacy includes the right to 
informational privacy,” said Justice Barry. “Existence 
of a reasonable expectation of privacy is determined 
by a contextual approach, which examines a number of 
factors, including: [1] the nature of the information; 
[2] the nature of the relationship between the 
parties; [3] the place where the information was 
obtained; [4] the manner in which the information was 
obtained; and [5] the seriousness of 
the crime being investigated.” He also 
noted that, as convicted offenders still 
under sentence, persons targeted by 
the DNA databank provisions have a 
much reduced expectation of privacy 
“Release of information regarding a 
match does not reveal intimate 
details about the lifestyle and 
personal choices of the individual.”
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and, by reason of their crimes, have lost any 
reasonable expectation that their identity will remain 
secret from law enforcement authorities.  After 
reviewing several cases, Justice Barry concluded the 
accused did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the DNA match:
… [H]ere the nature of the information obtainable 
from the DNA sample fell within the “biological 
core of personal information” constitutionally 
protected, even though its use was restricted to 
the purpose of identification.  However, the 
information used to ground the application for the 
DNA warrant, that resulted in the evidence which 
the trial judge ordered excluded, was merely the 
fact that there had been a match between [the 
accused’s] DNA profile obtained from the sample 
and biological evidence from two crime scenes.  
That information … is not of the sort which, if 
released, will lead to an increased risk of state 
abuse or undermine the dignity, integrity or 
autonomy of individuals… Release of information 
regarding a match does not reveal intimate details 
about the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual.
Turning to … the relationship between the parties, 
when the match was made, [the accused] fell within 
the category of convicted offender with … a “much 
reduced expectation of privacy”.  The main question 
for this Court is whether the privacy interests of 
individuals would be unduly threatened if police are 
permitted to use, after the initial DNA order has 
been set aside, information previously derived from 
a DNA sample. More specifically, does the setting 
aside of a DNA order result in the restoration of 
such a high level of expectation of privacy to the 
DNA sample and information derived from it that 
subsequent use of the information should be 
prohibited?  I am not persuaded that the 
fundamental principles underlying the right to 
privacy must lead to such a result. 
 
… [T]o avoid the “system of subsequent validation 
for searches”, which will arise if courts engage in 
ex post facto analysis, it is still appropriate to note 
that in the present circumstances the only 
individuals affected by the release of information 
regarding a match would be those who have left 
biological evidence at a crime scene and whose DNA 
profile ends up in the national DNA databank 
because of a conviction.   Framing the question in 
broad and neutral terms … in a society such as ours, 
would persons who leave biological evidence at a 
crime scene have a reasonable expectation that 
information regarding a match with their DNA 
profile in the national DNA data bank would remain 
private because the initial DNA order has been set 
aside?  The answer is “no”.  They may have a revived 
or heightened expectation in the privacy of their 
DNA sample once the order has been finally set 
aside.  But no threat to individual dignity, integrity 
or autonomy arises from permitting use of the 
information about the match and no significant risk 
of state abuse.   The fact of the match is the 
information for which privacy is sought.   But 
release of that information cannot threaten 
Charter values since there is no dissemination of a 
biological core of personal information.
It should also be noted here, in considering the 
relationship between the parties, that s. 
487.056(1) of the Code authorizes taking a DNA 
sample even though an appeal is pending.   Also, s. 
9(2)(a) of the DNA Identification Act provides for 
information in the convicted offender’s index to be 
permanently removed after an authorizing order 
has been “finally” set aside.   To avoid frustrating 
the Crown’s right of appeal, this has to mean, in the 
present context, after expiration of the 60 day 
period for appealing the decision to set aside the 
DNA order.  So [the accused’s] profile was lawfully 
in the data bank … [and he] would have no significant 
expectation of privacy … when the DNA warrants 
were issued.
Considering … the place where the information was 
obtained, it was not obtained from the residence of 
a citizen but from an officially sanctioned data 
bank, pointing to a reduced expectation of privacy.
On the fourth factor, the manner in which the 
information was obtained, it is significant that the 
information flowed from a valid court order, which 
led to a DNA sample and a DNA profile being 
recorded.  Absolutely no hint of police misconduct 
or willful blindness arises in this case.
As to the fifth factor, the seriousness of the 
crimes being investigated, two break and entries 
may not be at the most serious end of the spectrum 
of offences but neither should they be regarded as 
not serious.  Significant weight must be given here 
to the state’s interest in effective law enforcement 
when performing the balancing exercise …  and 
assessing whether the individual’s interest in being 
left alone must give way to this state interest. 
[references omitted, paras. 50-56]
And further:
The position [the accused] found himself in after 
the DNA order had been set aside is analogous to 
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that experienced by the suspects in Tessling and 
Plant: the information sought to be contained by a 
claim to privacy had already escaped the possession 
and control of the suspect.   In Tessling heat 
escaping from a house could not be controlled; in 
Plant the electricity records were generated and 
controlled by a third party (the electrical 
company).  ….  Similarly, once the information about 
the DNA match had been conveyed to the police 
officers investigating the two crime scenes in a 
lawful manner, [the accused] could have very little 
expectation of privacy regarding the information.  
It may have been good luck for society that police 
obtained the DNA match during the appeal period, 
before this Court set aside the DNA order.  But the 
release of this information linking him to biological 
evidence found at two crime scenes, like the heat 
emanating from Tessling’s house, meant the 
information was largely outside his control and 
available for use by the police as authorized by the 
DNA legislation.   Plant and A.M. support the 
conclusion that it does not unduly diminish Charter 
values to interpret the legislation as contemplating 
use of information derived from a DNA sample, 
after a ruling setting aside the original DNA order, 
where the information has been obtained while the 
order was operative.  [para. 59]
Thus, in evaluating and applying the five informational 
privacy factors and properly balancing individual and 
state interests, Justice Barry concluded the 
accused’s s.8 Charter rights were not breached. 
Therefore, the trial judge erred in finding an 
unreasonable search or seizure. And since there was 
no Charter violation there was no need to determine 
whether the evidence obtained pursuant to the DNA 
warrants should have been excluded under s.24(2).  
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside, and the matter was remitted 
for trial.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PROPER BREATH DEMAND 
INFERRED FROM 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Truscott, 2009 BCSC 364
The accused was stopped at a 
Counterattack road check and admitted 
to having consumed “a few” alcoholic 
drinks. A roadside breath sample was 
demanded into an approved screening device and the 
accused failed. He was arrested for impaired driving, 
given his Charter s.10(b) and read the breath demand. 
He was taken to the police detachment where efforts 
to obtain two samples was unsuccessful. He made five 
attempts at providing a breath sample but only one 
was successful, registering a reading of 250mg%.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer said he read the breath demand verbatim 
from a card, but the card was not read into the court 
record. The judge, although noting that it may be 
preferable for the officer to read into the record the 
exact wording of the demand, inferred a proper 
breath demand was nevertheless made because the 
officer said he had read a breath demand to the 
accused from a card, the accused indicated he 
understood, went to the detachment, and made 
several attempts to provide a sample of his breath. 
The accused was convicted of failing or refusing to 
provide a breath sample, contrary to s. 254(3) of the 
Criminal Code.  
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court arguing the trial judge erred in 
concluding that the Crown had proved that a lawful 
and valid breath demand was made, an essential 
element of the offence of refusal to provide a breath 
sample. In his view, there was absolutely no evidence 
of the form of demand and no evidence of compliance 
with the provisions of the Criminal Code.  The Crown, 
on the other hand, submitted the trial judge correctly 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances that the 
substance of the breath demand was clear.  The 
officer said he read the breath demand verbatim and, 
following the accused’s arrest for impaired driving, he 
was taken to the detachment, introduced to the 
breath technician, and he purposely provided four 
invalid samples and one valid sample.  
In dismissing the accused’s appeal Justice Warren 
agreed with Crown that the trial judge did not err in 
inferring that a valid demand was made. “The trial 
judge then considered all of the circumstances from 
that moment until the [accused] was charged with 
refusal to provide a breath sample, and on that 
evidence, having heard and seen the arresting officer 
and the attending qualified technician, as well as the 
evidence given by the [accused], she rightly concluded 
in my view, that the police officer had made a proper 
breath demand,” said Justice Warren. And further:
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The Crown submits that the following facts were 
capable of supporting a valid demand:  
• the [accused] was stopped in a Counterattack 
roadblock and admitted consuming “a few alcoholic 
drinks”;  
•  [he] was asked to walk to the police car in order 
for a roadside test to be conducted; 
• an approved screening demand was made; 
• [he] provided a valid sample into the approved 
screening device and the result was a fail;  
• [he] was arrested for impaired driving;  
• he was taken to the police station;  
• a qualified technician designated by the 
Attorney General introduced himself;  
• the qualified technician demonstrated to the 
[accused] how to provide a valid sample;  
• [he] purposely provided four invalid samples;  
• [he] provided one sample suitable for analysis;  
• [he] understood what was required of him 
because he testified that all times he blew and he 
blew into the tube until he had no oxygen left in his 
lungs; and 
• [he] understood that he would be charged with 
a criminal offence if he did not provide valid 
samples.  
• These factual circumstances together with the 
police officer’s evidence at trial that he read the 
breath demand to the [accused] was a sufficient 
body of evidence from which the trial judge could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that lawful 
demand had been made.  [para. 20]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
INCIDENTAL ARREST SEARCH 
NOT OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED: 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED ANYWAYS
R. v. Wilkening, 2009 ABCA 9
 
Specially trained police officers, as 
part of a “Jetway” program, were at a 
bus depot looking for suspiciously 
behaving passengers when there 
attention was directed towards the accused because 
his luggage consisted of a large box labeled as 
containing a flat screen television. Officers engaged 
the accused in conversation and then conducted a 
CPIC check by telephone, which revealed that he was 
the subject of an outstanding warrant for violating a 
provision of Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act.  He was 
arrested on the warrant and patted-down. No 
weapons, illicit substances, or other contraband was 
located. He was then placed in their police van and the 
box he was carrying was placed in the back of the van. 
It was searched and police found a flat-screen 
television together with several handguns. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the officers 
testified they searched the box as incident to the 
accused’s arrest, concerned for officer safety with 
carrying an unsearched box in their vehicle when they 
transported him to lockup. The trial judge, however, 
determined that the warrantless search of the box 
breached the accused’s s.8 Charter rights. Although 
the subjective portion of the test for search 
incidental to arrest was made out, no objective 
reasons why officer safety was a concern, other than 
conjecture as to the contents of the box, were 
offered. He reasoned that there was nothing to 
suggest that the accused was violent, as he was 
cooperative throughout, and that a Traffic Safety 
Act violation hardly raised the specter of violence. 
Moreover, stated concerns about explosives and bio-
hazards were belied by the manner in which the 
search was conducted, with absolutely no protection 
from any such concern. On this point the trial judge 
stated:
The scenario then exists where two highly 
experienced R.C.M.P. officers choose to lift a box 
with unexplained contents to the rear of an 
unprotected van.  They then, in the presence of one 
looking over the other’s shoulder, proceed to open 
and reach into the box without protection for all of 
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (b) False—see R. v. Perry & Richard (at p. 14 of 
this publication). 
2. (a) True—see R. v. Williams (at p. 7 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Chubak (at p. 20 of this 
publication).
4. (c) 76%—see “Supreme Court Hearings Rise”  (at 
p. 28 of this publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. McCrinnon (at p. 29 of this 
publication). 
6. (b) False—see “What Makes You an Expert?” R. v. 
N.O. (at p. 38 of this publication). 
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the safety concerns enunciated through various 
points in their evidence.  While their actions may 
have been reasonable had their suspicions been 
limited to guns, knives or other weapons solely, they 
take no obvious precautions against the threat of 
explosion or biochemical hazard which [one officer] 
indicates to be constituent part of their safety 
concern.  The box was within feet of one or all of the 
officers throughout the entire encounter with the 
Accused prior to discovering the guns. The actions 
taken by all three officers in the conduct of 
handling the Accused and his possessions were 
inconsistent with their own descriptions of the 
potential threats posed to them. [para. 76, 2007 
ABPC 241]
As a result, the search of the box was not reasonable 
as incidental to the accused’s arrest—it had nothing 
to do with the Traffic Safety Act arrest warrant and 
there was no reasonable concern for safety that 
might have justified a search of the box. Following a 
s.24(2) Charter analysis, however, the evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted. 
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence 
under s.24(2). In his view, the police officers’ 
purpose, from the moment they observed the 
accused, was to search the box, which made the 
breach more serious than the judge considered. By 
engaging him in conversation and learning his name, a 
computer search revealed the traffic warrant, which 
in turn led to the accused’s arrest and provided the 
officers with the pretext to search the box. The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the trial 
judge erred in finding a s.8 Charter breach in the 
first place because the search was properly 
conducted as an incident to arrest. 
The unanimous Appeal Court found it unnecessary to 
address the s.8 analysis because the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s.24(2). The trial judge 
found the officer’s subjectively believed they should 
and were entitled by law to search the box incident to 
arrest. This was not an unreasonable conclusion the 
Appeal Court ruled: 
 
The officers testified they were concerned about 
their personal safety in transporting the un-
searched box with [the accused] to the police lock-
up. They were aware, based on their experience, 
that the bus terminal was used for the transit of 
firearms and drugs, and testified that this added to 
their concerns about what might be in the box. [The 
accused] argues that the police did not need to take 
the box with them when they transported him to 
lock-up. We are not persuaded by this argument. 
[The accused] was arrested just outside the Calgary 
bus depot, traveling alone and carrying the box. 
Police cannot be expected to take steps to secure 
property carried by arrested persons, other than to 
place that property in police-controlled locked 
compounds. Nor can they be expected to simply 
abandon such property on the street. [para. 14]
 
And the officers’ failure to ensure that the search 
was objectively incidental to arrest did not 
demonstrate bad faith. The evidence was real and 
non-conscriptive, and there was a reduced 
expectation of privacy in a partially open box carried 
through a public place:
The trial judge properly considered that the box 
carried by [the accused] would attract a lessor 
degree of privacy expectation than would a home or 
a private vehicle. We also agree that an unlocked 
cardboard box is not in the same category as locked 
luggage or a locked trunk. In this case, the box did 
not even completely obscure what was in it. When 
someone walks through a public place with part of 
the contents of a container exposed, their 
expectation of privacy with respect to all of that 
container has to be less than that of another person 
who carefully packaged items to the point of 
securing the container with a lock. [para. 18]
As well, the the manner of the search was not 
abusive—it was not a body cavity search but a search 
of a box carried by the accused when he was arrested. 
There was ample basis for the judge to conclude that 
the evidence should be admitted under s.24(2). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.   
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca       
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